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This dissertation describes three studies on the linkages between changes in
financial markets and firm-level performance in real economy. The first chapter stud-
ies the impact of foreign bank deregulation on domestic firms’ credit access and real
outcomes in China, using an extensive firm-level data set from the manufacturing
census. Following the deregulation policies implemented by the government in 2001,
foreign banks were allowed to enter the Chinese banking market gradually, in differ-
ent years in different cities. As a result, from 2001 to 2006 firms in different cities had
differential access to foreign bank credit. Empirical results suggest that after foreign
bank entry, private-owned firms which were previously more credit-constrained ob-
tained more bank loans, increased investment and increased sales significantly more
than state-owned firms, which were previously less constrained. The findings pro-
vide evidence that policy-driven positive foreign credit supply shocks could reduce
domestic firms’ financing constraints, especially for private-owned enterprises. In ad-
dition, I investigate the hypothesis that foreign bank entry intensified competition in
the domestic banking sector, using a newly constructed regional bank competition
index. Results confirm that increases in bank competition brought by foreign bank
entry improved credit access for private-owned firms relative to state-owned firms.
The second chapter studies determinants and impacts of foreign currency bor-
rowing by firms in emerging Europe. Most of existing studies on currency mismatch
focus on large corporations, and this study complements literature by using firm-
level survey data mainly covering small non-listed firms. The third chapter presents
evidence on zombie firms and stimulating policies in China. We apply the framework
from the seminal study of zombie firms in Japan to a broader manufacturing census
sample in China between 1998 and 2013. We show that the number and the mag-
nitude of undesirable zombie firms increased sharply after an enormous monetary
expansion right after the 2008 financial crisis.




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment













To my parents, Xiaoqin Xu and Xiaoming Li, and Cassie Weixu Zheng
ii
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation committee members
at University of Maryland, in particular, my chair Professor Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan,
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Chapter 1: The Impact of Foreign Bank Deregulation on Firm Per-
formance: Evidence from China
1.1 Introduction
Chinese banking is dominated by four very large state-owned banks, the “Big
Four”, and such state ownership is associated with low efficiency and restricted
access to credit for private firms. Recent financial reforms announced by Chinese
authorities, including foreign bank entry and development of international bond
markets, have allowed domestic corporate borrowers to get access to foreign funds.
Previous studies have documented that the entry of these foreign banks has been
associated with a more competitive and efficient banking environment in China.1
In this chapter, I analyze whether opening up the banking sector for foreign bank
entry has affected the performance of Chinese manufacturing firms, to the extent
that the banking sector became more competitive and efficient after foreign bank
entry was allowed. Understanding how financial liberalization affects domestic firms’
performance is critical for making informed policy decisions.
1See Lin and Zhang (2009) and Xu (2011).
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As part of its commitment to join the World Trade Organization (WTO),
China removed restrictions on banking in addition to trade. Specifically, the Chinese
central government agreed to remove restrictions on foreign banks’ local currency
business in a number of cities every year during the first 5 years after accession
(2001-2006), with no restriction on foreign banks anywhere in the country after-
wards. This step-by-step deregulation of foreign banks provides a suitable policy
experiment for analyzing the effects of foreign bank entry on the domestic financial
system and firms’ performance.2 Theoretically, foreign bank competition may pro-
vide a greater supply of aggregate bank credit to all domestic borrowers and improve
allocative efficiency. Financially constrained private firms could also benefit when
large Chinese corporations increase their borrowing from foreign banks, since local
banks might have to look for other small and retail customers. If large firms turn
away from domestic financing sources, commercial banks in China would be able to
allocate more resources to financially constrained borrowers, creating a “crowd-in
effect”.
For identification, I explore this policy-driven timing and geographic varia-
tion across cities in China, regarding when foreign banks started conducting local-
currency business with domestic borrowers located in the same city. There are three
main threats to identification based on the timing and geographic policy variation.
First, spillover effects of foreign bank entry across cities could exist. Here I assume
that the direct effect of foreign bank entry is localized (although there can be other
2“Foreign bank entry/deregulation”in this study refers to foreign banks being allowed to conduct
local-currency business with domestic borrowers.
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linkages across cities via firm competition, general equilibrium price effects, etc).
This assumption is reasonable given the regulation that firms in one city could not
borrow from banks in another city before the end of 2006. As a result, these regional
policies can be viewed as a shock to local credit supply. During a given period, firms
in different cities have differential access to foreign bank credit.
Secondly, there were other reforms undertaken during the sample period, and
these reforms could also have differential effects on firms’ performance across cities.
However, other reforms in China during the period proceeded on a nationwide basis,
rather than following a specific regional timetable. Therefore, the effects of other
reforms would not confound the foreign bank deregulation effect, and will be ab-
sorbed by the time fixed effects. Even if the impact of another policy is not uniform
across cities (e.g. international trade exposure), the policy should not be perfectly
correlated with the foreign bank entry indicator. Thirdly and more importantly,
choices about the timing and location of foreign bank entry may be endogenously
determined. The timing decisions on foreign bank entry were made by the cen-
tral government and I assume they were unrelated to the firm-specific demand for
credit. As a robustness check, I also conduct matching exercises to address concerns
of selection bias over the choice on “opened cities”.
Based on this identification strategy, I estimate the impact of foreign bank en-
try on firms’ credit access and performance in China, focusing on whether the impact
at the firm level differs by heterogeneity in credit constraints and productivity. I
employ a difference in difference strategy and investigate the effect of the removal of
foreign bank regulation on private firms’ performance relative to that of state-owned
3
firms (SOEs), using panel data on manufacturing firms from China Annual Surveys
of Industrial Firms (CASIF) from 1998 to 2007. This dataset covers around 90%
of manufacturing GDP in China during the sample period, and provides detailed
information on firms’ performance and ownership structure. Following Song et al.
(2011), I use ownership structure as a proxy for firms’ financial constraints under
the assumption that private-owned firms had less access to credit than state-owned
firms prior to bank deregulation.3 With rich panel data, I can control for firm and
city-sector-year fixed effects, as well as time trends that are different for SOEs and
private firms, as well as city-year or sector-year specific policy changes, identifying
using the difference between within-firm changes of state-owned and private-owned
firms.
I find that foreign bank entry does not have a significant impact on credit
access for the average firm, as measured by the amount of bank loans, investment
and sales. However, the impact of foreign bank entry varies with a firm’s own-
ership. Private-owned firms, which were presumably previously more financially
constrained, generally benefit more from foreign bank entry relative to less con-
strained state-owned firms. After foreign bank entry is allowed, private-owned firms
obtain more bank loans, increase investment and increase sales significantly more
than state-owned firms. This finding that foreign bank deregulation benefits pri-
vate firms’ credit access more than that of state-owned firms provides new insights
on financial liberalization in China. My results do not suggest that foreign banks
3The key model building block in Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) assumes that private
firms with high productivity are financially constrained, while state-owned enterprises with low
productivity have access to external finance, and this assumption is justified by empirical evidence.
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deal mostly with large state-owned firms with government support due to foreign
banks’ information disadvantage. One potential mechanism for my findings is that
foreign bank deregulation is related to a higher level of banking competition and
more abundant credit flow to domestic private firms via a “crowd-in effect”.
In terms of methodology, this chapter is related to studies on state-level bank-
ing reforms in United States. Using timing and state-level variation on cross-state
bank branch legislation, Morgan et al. (2004) find that interstate bank branching
deregulation leads to higher integration and less output volatility across US states.
My chapter focuses on city-level foreign bank deregulation policies adopted in differ-
ent years in China. One important difference is that each US state made individual
decisions on legislation about bank branching, while the deregulation policies in
China were implemented by the central government.
This chapter also adds to the literature on the impact of foreign bank entry
into developing countries. There exist two different views on the impact of foreign
bank entry on firms’ access to credit and performance.4 Some papers find a “cream-
skimming” effect, where foreign banks lend only to the most profitable local firms.
For example, Mian (2006) and Gormley (2010) suggest that foreign bank entry tends
to benefit larger firms only and may even hurt SMEs due to information asymmetry.
However, Clarke et al. (2006) find that foreign bank entry helps reduce financing
constraints for all firms, including SMEs. Giannetti and Ongena (2009) conclude
that foreign bank entry stimulates growth in firm sales, assets and leverage for both
listed and unlisted companies in Eastern European countries. My results are similar
4See Clarke et al. (2006), Mian (2006), Detragiache et al. (2008), and Gormley (2010).
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to the latter two studies, suggesting that foreign bank entry in China relaxes financial
constraints.
As a case study in an emerging market, this chapter is closely related to Gorm-
ley (2010), which studies the impact of foreign bank entry on firms’ performance
in India. He uses variation in the location of foreign banks following a change in
India’s foreign bank lending policy. He finds that firms on average are less likely
to get bank credit after foreign bank entry due to information asymmetry, but that
profitable firms are more likely to secure bank credit. This chapter differs in two
important dimensions. First, China has a state-run sector that had privileged access
to credit prior to reform, so I focus on the differential effects between state-owned
firms and private-owned firms, not just the overall level effect. Second, unlike India,
the Chinese banking market was liberalized to foreign competition gradually, rather
than all at once. In addition, I use a large representative sample of both state-owned
firms and private-owned firms from manufacturing census data to study the impacts
of foreign bank entry on different outcomes via an easing of financial constraints
and through increased banking competition, instead of focusing on the information
disadvantage of foreign banks.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides an
overview of China’s policy change regarding foreign bank deregulation. Section 1.3
describes the firm-level data I use in this study, and the baseline regression and
identification strategy are explained in Section 1.4. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 present the
main results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
6
1.2 Policy Experiment with Banking Sector Liberalization
1.2.1 The Chinese Banking Sector before WTO Accession
Prior to the reform in 1978, China had a single financial system. The People’s
Bank of China (PBOC) acted both as a commercial bank and a central bank. In
1978, the PBOC was split into four state-owned banks and authorities began to
establish various specialized commercial banks. Despite these reforms, financial
policies in China remained heavily repressive, with heavily regulated interest rates,
state-influenced credit allocation, frequently adjusted reserve requirements, and a
tightly controlled capital account. A comprehensive dataset provided by Abiad et al.
(2010) provides an index of financial liberalization for China and other countries in
2001, the year of China’s WTO entry. China’s financial liberalization index for that
year was 0.36, which is quite low compared to the average for advanced economies,
0.93, or the average for emerging economies, 0.67.
This chapter focuses on the financial opening in China following WTO entry.
Before 2001, there were already a certain number of foreign bank branches operating
in different cities. These branches, however, were only allowed to conduct foreign-
currency business with foreign companies and foreign residents. Some foreign banks
actually came to China following companies from their home countries that were
making direct investments in the country. These banks had very limited business
scope and could not lend to domestic firms directly.
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1.2.2 Policy Experiment with Foreign Bank Entry
“Foreign bank entry” in this study refers to foreign banks being allowed to
conduct local-currency business with domestic firms. Restrictions on foreign banking
activities were substantially relaxed after China acceded to the WTO in December
2001. During 2001-2006, the geographic and client restrictions on local currency
business of foreign banks were phased out gradually based on the WTO accession
agenda. This step-by-step entry of foreign banks provides a unique policy experiment
for analyzing the effects of financial opening on the domestic economy. Foreign banks
were allowed to enter 20 Chinese cities (the “opened regions”) in phases before the
end of 2005, and all geographic restrictions were removed by the end of 2006.5
Table 1.1 shows a detailed timeline of geographic and client restrictions for
local currency business.6 For local currency business, the geographic restrictions on
foreign bank lending were phased out gradually, starting with 4 cities (Shanghai,
Shenzhen, Tianjin, Dalian) at the end of 2001. Foreign banks were allowed to con-
duct RMB business in Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Nanjing and Wuhan at the
end of 2002; in Jinan, Fuzhou, Chengdu, Chongqing at the end of 2003; in Beijing,
Kunming and Xiamen at the end of 2004; and in Shantou, Ningbo, Shenyang and
Xi’an at the end of 2005. Geographic restrictions on local currency business were
completely lifted at the end of 2006. Before the end of 2006, foreign financial institu-
5 The city locations for opened regions are mapped in Figure 1.5, which highlights the 20 cities
where foreign banks could enter in phases.
6For foreign-currency business, there were no geographic or client restrictions at the time of
WTO accession.
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Table 1.1: Geographic and client restrictions for local currency business of foreign
banks
Geographic coverage Cities with foreign bank entry in local currency business
the end of 2001 Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Dalian
the end of 2002 Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Nanjing, Wuhan
the end of 2003 Jinan, Fuzhou, Chengdu, Chongqing
the end of 2004 Beijing, Kunming, Xiamen
the end of 2005 Shantou, Ningbo, Shenyang, Xi’an
the end of 2006 All other regions
Client coverage local currency business for foreign banks
the end of 2001 permitted to invest in domestic banks
the end of 2003 permitted to provide services to Chinese enterprises
the end of 2006 permitted to provide services to all Chinese clients
Source: See page 34 of the document WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2, which is available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/acc e/completeacc e.htm
tions in one region of China could not serve clients in any other region that had not
been opened for foreign banks. In addition to the geographic coverage regulation,
Table 1.1 also shows the client coverage policy. For local currency business, foreign
financial institutions were permitted to provide services to Chinese enterprises at the
end of 2003. The client restriction was lifted at the end of 2006, when foreign finan-
cial institutions were permitted to provide services to all Chinese clients, including
both firms and households.
I combine the geographic and client restrictions on foreign bank lending listed
in Table 1.1 to obtain geographic variation across regions in local firms’ access to
foreign bank local currency lending. First, foreign banks in 13 cities were allowed
to conduct local currency business with domestic firms in the same city, starting
from the end of 2003.7 The authorities added another three cities to the list at
7The 13 cities are listed in the first 3 rows in Table 1.1.
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the end of 2004 and four more cities at the end of 2005. Foreign banks could still
invest in domestic banks in opened cities when they could not lend to domestic firms
directly. In this way, domestic firms could benefit from foreign bank entry indirectly.
Restrictions on the geographic and client coverage of foreign banks’ local-currency
business were completely lifted by the end of 2006. Beginning in 2007, foreign banks
were allowed to conduct local-currency business with local firms and households
across the entire country.
Aggregate Foreign Bank Data
As a result of the government’s liberalization on foreign entry and foreign
banking activities, China has seen a rapid increase of foreign bank presence in the
post-WTO period. Foreign banks indeed entered into Chinese cities to commence
local-currency business when restrictions were removed, and existing foreign banks
expanded their business. For example, foreign banks issued more than 40% of new
local-currency loans in Shanghai in 2006 (Xu and Lin, 2007).
Table 1.2 summarizes the activities of foreign bank entities in China between
2003 and 2010.8 During the financial opening period, the total number of foreign
banking entities almost doubled, and total banking assets tripled from 2003 to 2007.
Figure 1.1 shows that there was a surge in foreign bank loans between 2003 and
2004 when foreign banks were permitted to lend to local firms. Another important
feature of foreign bank activities shown in Figure 1.1 is that foreign banks extended
more loans than they collected in deposits, because they could get funding from
8Data for foreign bank activities is not available prior to 2003.
10
foreign countries to fill the gap between loans and deposits. Following the WTO
accession, there was a sharp rise in loans followed by a rise in deposits, indicating a
faster expansion of business due to relaxed restrictions.
Figure 1.1: Balance sheets of foreign banks in China
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2007), Xu (2011)
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Industrial Firm-Level Data
The Chinese firm-level data are from China Annual Surveys of Industrial Firms
(CASIF) from 1998 to 2007. These surveys are conducted by the government’s




























































































































































































































































































































































state-owned industrial firms with more than 5 million RMB in revenue.9 Industrial
firms are defined here to include manufacturing, mining and public utilities.10 The
unit of observation is a firm, defined as a legal unit. Large Chinese enterprises
may have multiple subsidiaries. As long as these subsidiaries are legal units, they
will enter the dataset as individual firms. Brandt et al. (2012b, 2014) provide an
excellent introduction and description of the CASIF dataset.
Coverage of the Sample
I set the sample period from 1998 to 2007 to cover the financial opening period
following WTO accession. The raw dataset consists of over 160,000 firms in 1998
and grows to over 330,000 firms in 2007. This unbalanced panel of firms between
1998-2007 is the most comprehensive data available for Chinese firm-level research.11
It includes the production and financial variables of small and private firms, which
is a big advantage over Compustat/Worldscope, which cover only large listed cor-
porations. Table 1.3 provides the number of firms for the data sample in each year,
9This dataset is truncated by size, as measured by firm’s revenue. At the exchange rate of 8.27
RMB/USD, in force between January 1997 and July 2005, 5 million RMB amounts to 605,000 USD.
Since smaller Chinese firms are more likely to be financially constrained, the estimated financial
friction should be interpreted as a lower bound of the credit constraints faced by Chinese firms.
10Dougherty et al. (2007) and Jefferson et al. (2008) are two of the earliest studies using this
data. These studies analyze topics of particular importance to China, namely, the emergence of
the private sector and productivity convergence by ownership type and across space. Subsequently,
researchers have studied a variety of topics spanning almost all fields of economics. In macroe-
conomics, for example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Song et al. (2011) use the data to study
resource reallocation and aggregate TFP growth. In international economics, Park et al. (2010)
study the impact of the Asian financial crisis on Chinese manufacturing firms, while Brandt et al.
(2012a) document large productivity effects associated with China’s entry into the WTO. In in-
dustrial organization, Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014) estimate the efficiency gains resulting from
restructuring of the electricity sector. Aghion et al. (2015) evaluate the effectiveness of China’s
industrial policy more generally.
11Some key variables are missing in 2008 and 2009, so I use the years from 1998 to 2007.
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as well as the shares of value added and the wage bill compared with national ag-
gregate statistics in the manufacturing sector. Generally, the data sample has very
good coverage in China’s manufacturing sector, in terms of value added and the
wage bill. For example, compared to the full census of firms conducted by NBS
in 2004, this truncated census sample used in this chapter represents about 90%
of value added in manufacturing industries, showing the sample is very close the
universe of all manufacturing firms in China.
Table 1.3: Sample coverage: compared with national aggregate statistics
Share in manufacturing sector
Year Number of firms Value added Wage bill
1998 165,118 0.57 0.75
1999 162,033 0.60 0.71
2000 162,885 0.64 0.72
2001 171,256 0.64 0.72
2002 181,557 0.70 0.70
2003 196,222 0.77 0.73
2004 279,092 0.90 0.85
2005 271,835 0.82 0.87
2006 301,961 0.88 0.90
2007 336,768 0.93 0.96
Notes: Statistics are calculated by summing over all active firms in the CASIF dataset , and then
dividing by the aggregate statistics from China’s macro data in China Statistical Yearbooks.
Firm-Level Variables
Table 1.4 lists the most important variables included in the CASIF data. The
data include identifying information with detailed industry and geographic codes.
Firm ownership can be identified using the official registration type or from the share
in paid-up capital of different groups. Stock variables include various measures of
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assets, debt, equity inventory, and accounts receivable. Flow variables detail various
dimensions of output, including export volumes, inputs, and taxes.
Table 1.4: Variables reported in the annual CASIF firm-level data
Variables Sample period 1998-2007
Identification ID, name, registration type, shareholding status, legal person name,
industry code, geographic code, zip code, phone, start year
Stocks Capital structure: owner’s equity, paid-in capital (split into six categories)
Assets: total, current, fixed assets, intangible, inventory, accounts receivable
Debts: total, current, long-term liabilities
Flows Output: sales revenue, output value, value added, exports, total profit
Input factors: employment, wages, materials and intermediate inputs,
long-term investment, depreciation, financial cost, interest expense
Notes: (1) paid-in capital split into six categories: state, collective, foreign, Hong
Kong/Macau/Taiwan (HMT), individual, legal person; (2) for fixed assets, values for total, net
value, and at original price fixed assets are reported.
Table 1.5 shows the structure of this unbalanced panel data after matching
firms over time. The majority of firm linkages over time are made directly using
the unique firm identifiers assigned by the NBS. The current system of IDs was
implemented in 1998 and the same IDs are also used in the full census. Occasionally,
firms receive a new ID as a result of restructuring, merger or acquisition. In these
cases, I also use the firm’s name, industry, and address to link firms across years,
following the do-file code provided by Brandt et al. (2012b).
Table 1.5: Linking observations over time to identify firms






State-Owned vs. Private Firms
Firm ownership status is a potential source of heterogeneity in the impact
of the financial opening policy in China.12 Figure 1.2 reports that there was a
substantial drop in the share of firms that were state-owned between 1998 and 2007,
primarily due to reforms and privatizations on public enterprises implemented in
the late 1990s.13 Therefore, the changes in ownership composition across sectors
can be a source of heterogeneity to exploit in my empirical analysis. I will control
for different trends for firms with different ownership in my analysis in the next
section.
12The CASIF dataset reports registered ownership type for each firm, and I use this registration
type to identify firms’ ownership category. I can also identify firm’s ownership based on owner’s
equity structure (paid-in capital), as we observe the composition of firms’ paid-in capital split into
six categories. The two measures of firm’s ownership are very similar, and results are robust if I
move to the ownership definition based on equity structure.
13See Hsieh and Song (2015) for more details on the institutional background of SOE reforms.
16
Figure 1.2: Share of state-owned firms in China declines over time
Source: Author’s calculation based on CASIF data
Existing empirical literature suggests that there are large differences between
SOEs and private firms in terms of productivity, capital intensity, bank discrimina-
tion and credit constraints.14 SOEs generally have political connections and ben-
efit from subsidized credit from state-owned banks, while private firms (generally
without political connections) can only borrow at high interest rates from informal
financial markets or rely on self-financing.
Here I provide some additional suggestive evidence that SOEs are different
from private firms, using firm-level data on subsidies received and interest payments.
Table 1.6 shows that state-owned firms on average received more government sub-
sidies and paid less interest relative to domestic private firms during the sample
14See Brandt and Li (2003) and Hsieh and Song (2015).
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period, after controlling for firm-level profitability and total liabilities in the last
year as well as city-year and industry-year fixed effects.
Table 1.6: SOEs received more subsidies and paid less interest
Dependent variable log(subsidy) log(interest payment)
sample: all cities (1) (2)
SOE 0.283*** -0.439***
(0.037) (0.031)
Profitability (lagged) Yes Yes
Firm size (lagged total liabilities) Yes Yes
City-year FE Yes Yes
Industry-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,116,740 462,173
R-squared 0.125 0.373
Notes: The dependent variables are logs of firm-level subsidies received from government and
total interest payments. SOE is defined as a dummy which equals one if the registration
ownership type is state-owned, and zero otherwise. Other control variables include firms’ total
liabilities in the previous year and the ratio of profit to revenue (profitability) in the previous
year. Clustered standard errors (at city level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.3.2 City-Level Financial Opening Reforms
China’s gradual opening up to foreign banks is a good experiment to study
the impact of foreign bank entry, or more generally to study the impact of finan-
cial reform.15 To identify the impact of foreign bank entry at the city-level, I use
variation in both the timing and location of new foreign banks’ entry, based on
the banking sector liberalization policy adopted by the Chinese central government
upon accession to the WTO in 2001.
15Fan and Kalemli-Özcan (2016) study the effect of country-level financial reform on corporate
savings in Asian countries. Here I use within-country variation across cities to identify the effect
of foreign bank entry reform.
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One might want to measure foreign bank activities in terms of their total assets
or total loans in a given region and year. It would also be useful to measure the
distribution of banks’ loans to different types of firms. However, there are empirical
challenges to obtaining such measures of foreign bank activities. Annual reports
of banks typically do not report the distribution of assets in different regions and
the distribution of loans to different types of firms. On the other hand, from the
manufacturing firm data, I cannot observe the sources of funds. In addition, these
measures are more likely than a simple dummy policy variable to be correlated with
local credit demand shocks.
Given these data limitations and endogeneity concern, I follow Lin (2011) and
simply use a dummy policy variable FBankc,t indicating the timing and geographic
variation in foreign bank entry into local currency business with firms in a particular
city. For example, in the city of Beijing, FBankc,2004 = 0 and FBankc,2005 =
FBankc,2006 = 1, since Beijing opened up for foreign bank entry at the end of 2004.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 The Average Impact of Foreign Bank Deregulation
Before I focus on differential impacts across firms, I first study the average
impact of financial reform on firms’ credit access and real activity. Firms located in
cities where foreign bank credit was unavailable and hence were plausibly unaffected
by foreign bank entry comprise the control group. Comparing outcomes of firms with
access to foreign bank lending to those of firms without such access identifies the
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average impact of foreign bank entry at the firm level. Specifically, I examine the
average impacts using the following specification:
Yi,c,j,t = αi + δp,t + φj,t + βFBankc,t + γXi,c,j,t + εi,c,j,t (1.1)
where i, c, j, t stand for firm, city, industry, and year respectively. The depen-
dent variable Yi,c,j,t is a firm-level outcome variable, such as bank loans, investment
or sales. Here I want to look at the direct impact of foreign bank deregulation, so
I control only for firm fixed effects αi, which absorb any unobserved time-invariant
firm effects, industry-year fixed effects φj,t and province-year fixed effects δp,t. I
do not use city-industry-year fixed effects here, which will be included in the next
specification. The foreign bank entry indicator FBankc,t varies at the city-year
level, so there is still within-province variation when province-year fixed effects are
included16. Xi,c,j,t controls for time-varying firm-level variables such as lagged firm
size and lagged profitability. The average impact of foreign bank entry is captured
by β. I assume that the effect of foreign bank entry is localized. This assumption is
justified given the regulation that firms in a given city could not borrow from banks
in another city before the end of 2006.17
City-level Aggregate Results
In additional to equation (1.1), I also run regressions at the city-level instead of
the firm level, to examine whether opening up a city for foreign bank entry is related
16Each province includes 10-20 cities.
17Due to the government imposed market segmentation by cities in China, firms are supposed
to apply for loan from banks in the same city.
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to changes in aggregate investment and output growth. City-level regressions are
specified with the following structure:
City Aggregatec,t = αc + δt + βFBankc,t + εc,t (1.2)
αc and δt represent city and year fixed effects. City Aggregatec,t equals the
sum of firm-level output or the real investment rate over all manufacturing firms
located in city c. The real capital stock for each year is obtained by deflating the
nominal capital stock with the investment deflator, which is calculated by Brandt,
Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012). City-level investment is normalized by the
city-level real capital stock.
1.4.2 Foreign Bank Deregulation and Firm Heterogeneity
To test whether foreign bank entry has differential effects across different types
of firms, I employ a difference-in-difference methodology and estimate the following
regression equation:
Yi,c,j,t = αi+δc,j,t+βFBankc,t×FirmTypei+γXi,c,j,t+λt×FirmTypei+εi,c,j,t (1.3)
where i, c, j, t stand for firm, city, industry, and year respectively. The
dependent variable is a firm-level outcome Yi,c,j,t, such as bank loans, investment,
or sales. FirmTypei is an indicator or continuous firm characteristic variable that
captures ex ante heterogeneity among firms, such as ownership type, profitability,
productivity and collateral ratio. The interaction term between FirmTypei and
policy dummy FBankc,t allows me to test whether foreign bank entry has differential
effects across different types of firms. δc,j,t denotes city-industry-year fixed effects, in
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which sectors are defined at the 2-digit-SIC level. These fixed effects control for any
industry-level policies and city-level policies that vary across years, such as subsidies
and taxes, as well as industry-city specific demand factors, that might affect results.
αi is a firm fixed effect, which absorbs any unobserved time-invariant firm effects.
A set of year and firm type interactions, t× FirmTypei, are also included to allow
firms with different pre-determined types have different linear trend. Xi,c,j,t controls
for time-varying firm-level variables such as lagged firm profitability and firm size.
εi,c,j,t represents the error term. The standard errors are clustered by city to allow
for correlation within a city across time, following Bertrand et al. (2004).
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 The Average Impact of Foreign Bank Entry
Table 1.7 shows estimation results measuring the average impact of foreign
bank entry on firm-level performance. Column (4) shows that firms in cities that
gained access to foreign bank loans increased investment by 12.7% (p-value=0.07),
relative to those in cities without foreign bank loans. In the other specifications, the
results indicate that on average firms did not increase sales, increase investment or
obtain more bank loans after the city was opened to foreign bank entry.
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Table 1.7: The average impact of foreign bank entry at firm-level
Dependent variable log(sales) log(investment) log(loans)
All cities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign bank 0.019 0.009 0.051 0.127* 0.022 0.033
(0.034) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.027) (0.029)
Firmsizet−1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Profitabilityt−1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,022,776 1,022,776 862,613 862,613 1,022,776 1,022,776
Adjusted R-squared 0.825 0.827 0.540 0.542 0.716 0.717
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of firm outcomes on the foreign bank entry
policy dummy using OLS. Firm fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects are included in all
columns. Columns (1), (3) and (5) control for city fixed effects while Columns (2), (4) and (6)
include province-year fixed effects. Lagged firm size (total assets) and lagged profitability (profit
divided by revenue) are used as firm-level time-varying control variables. Standard errors,
clustered at the city level, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Aggregate Results at City-level
Table 1.8 reports coefficients from a regression at the city-level as in equation
(2). The dependent variable is a city-level outcome, measured by aggregate output
or the aggregate investment rate. The insignificant coefficients on FBankc,t reported
in both columns indicate that cities that gained early access to foreign bank loans
did not increase aggregate investment or output relative to cities without access to
foreign bank loans. In the next section, I will turn to micro-data at the firm level
and report the differential effects of foreign bank deregulation across different types
of firms.
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Table 1.8: The aggregate impact of foreign bank entry at city-level
Dependent variable log(output) log(investment)
(1) (2)
Foreign bank 0.023 0.026
(0.101) (0.157)
City fixed effect Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes
Observations 2,404 2,845
Adjusted R-squared 0.920 0.759
Notes: This table reports coefficients from city-level panel regressions of city-level aggregate
output and investment (rate) on the foreign bank entry dummy using OLS. City and year fixed
effects are included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
1.5.2 Differential Effects of Foreign Bank Entry and Firm Heterogeneity
In this section, I report the differential effects of foreign bank entry across
firms with different ownership structure, productivity and collateral ratio, using the
timing variation of foreign bank entry across cities in the full sample.
1.5.2.1 State-owned vs. Private Firms (Main Results)
Previous literature suggests that discrimination in credit against private-owned
firms (POE) was common in domestic commercial banks even after WTO accession;
see Song et al. (2011). Here I test whether foreign bank entry has differential effects
on firms’ credit access and real performance between state-owned firms and private
firms, using the following specification:
Yi,c,j,t = αi + δc,j,t + βFBankc,t × Privatei + γXi,c,j,t + λt× Privatei + εi,c,j,t (1.4)
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Here I focus on domestic-owned firms only. Privatei is a time-invariant indi-
cator variable equal to 1 if the firm is classified as a private-owned firm in its initial
year in the sample, and 0 if the firm is state-owned. Lagged firm size (total assets)
and profitability are used as firm-level time-varying control variables. I use measures
of credit access, log sales and log investment as dependent variables. I control for
city-industry-year fixed effects. I also include a linear trend for private-owned firms,
t× Privatei, to allow firms with different ownership to have different trends.
Credit Access
For credit access, I measure firm-level bank loans as the difference between
short-term liabilities and accounts payable. The main rationale for this approxi-
mation is that (1) Chinese firms are less likely to borrow long-term using bank
loans during 1998-2007, and (2) financial intermediation in China is overwhelmingly
dominated by bank loans.
Table 1.9 shows the maturity composition of firms’ liabilities. Most firms
cannot access long-term financing and have to rely on short-term debt, especially
private-owned firms. Long-term financing seems a luxury good for firms during the
sample period. 65% of private firms report zero long-term debt on their balance
sheets. Table 1.9 also breaks down short term liabilities into accounts payable and
other short-term liabilities (primarily bank loans). Foreign firms receive more short-
term financing from accounts payable.
25
Table 1.9: Total liability decomposition
Ownership type
Share in total liability (%) State-owned Private-owned Foreign-owned
(1) Short-term liabilities 82.3% 89.2% 92.9%
(1.1) Accounts payable 21.7% 26.3% 39.2%
(1.2) Other short-term liabilities 60.6% 62.9% 53.7%
(2) Long-term debt 16.7% 8.9% 5.9%
Observations 469,802 1,068,516 379,412
% of firms report zero LT-debt 42.1% 64.7% 72.3%
Notes: Ownership defined based on registration ownership type. Total liabilities are decomposed
into short-term and long-term debt. I use the difference between short-term liabilities and
accounts payable as proxy for firm-level bank loans.
Table 1.10 reports the results using firm-level bank loans and long-term debt
(LT debt) as dependent variables in columns (1) and (3). Columns (2) and (4) report
results when the dependent variables are changes in the stock of loans or long-term
debt. I find that private-owned firms get more access to bank loans (both in levels
and in changes) after foreign bank entry, compared with SOEs. Column (3) suggests
that differential effects of foreign bank entry on access to long-term debt financing
(e.g. bonds) are not significant, due to a large standard error. One possible reason
is that the bond market in China was still under-developed during 2001-2007, when
financial institutions in China were almost all banks and few firms could have access
to long-term debt through the bond market.
26
Table 1.10: Differential effects on credit access: SOE vs. POE
Dependent variable log(loans) ∆log(loans) log(LT debt) ∆log(LT debt)
All cities (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign bank × Private 0.049** 0.051** 0.115 0.134
(0.021) (0.021) (0.074) (0.082)
Firm sizet−1 0.276*** -0.641*** 0.314*** -0.375***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.045) (0.033)
Profitabilityt−1 0.076** 0.450*** -0.024 0.240*
(0.030) (0.045) (0.115) (0.140)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
POE-time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered at city city city city
Observations 1,022,776 1,022,776 1,022,776 1,022,776
R-squared 0.717 0.272 0.719 0.283
Notes: This table reports the effects of foreign bank deregulation on private firms’ credit access
relative to that of SOEs. The dependent variables are (1) firm’s bank loans, proxied by the
difference between short term liabilities and accounts payable, and (2) long-term debt. All
regressions control for city-industry-year fixed effects, where industry classifications are at the
2-digit SIC level. Lagged firm size (total assets) and lagged profitability (profit divided by
revenue) are used as firm-level time-varying control variables. Foreign firms are not included in
the sample. Clustered standard errors (at city level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Sales, Investment and Productivity
Table 1.11 reports differential impacts of foreign bank entry on measures of
firms’ real activity. Column (1) indicates that sales revenue for private firms in-
creases more after foreign bank entry than revenue for SOEs. Sales grow by 3.8%
more among private firms than among SOEs after foreign bank entry. Columns (2)
shows that private firms increase investment by 4.3% more relative to SOEs after
foreign bank loans become available. Column (3) examines firm TFP as an outcome
variable. I test whether foreign bank entry, as a reduction in distortions in the access
to international capital markets, leads to an increase in productivity. One possible
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channel is that previously credit-constrained firms respond to better financing terms
by increasing their investment in technology18. Results in column (3) find that the
differential effects of foreign bank entry on firm’s estimated productivity are not
significant.
Table 1.11: Effect of foreign bank entry on firms’ performance: SOE vs. POE
Dependent variable log(sales) log(investment) log(TFP )
All cities (1) (2) (3)
Foreign bank × Private 0.038*** 0.043*** -0.006
(0.004) (0.015) (0.013)
Firm sizet−1 0.322*** -0.038*** 0.048***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
Profitabilityt−1 0.753*** 0.874*** 0.247***
(0.006) (0.022) (0.016)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes
POE-time trend Yes Yes Yes
Clustered at city city city
Observations 1,022,776 862,613 1,022,776
R-squared 0.924 0.669 0.729
Notes: This table reports the effects of foreign bank deregulation on private firms’ performance
relative to that of SOEs. The dependent variables are firm’s annual sales, investment and TFP
measured following Wooldridge (2009). All regressions control for firm and city-industry-year
fixed effects, where industry classifications are at the 2-digit SIC level. Lagged firms size (total
assets) and lagged profitability (profit divided by revenue) are used as firm-level time-varying
control variables. Foreign firms are not included in the sample. Clustered standard errors (at city
level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
One interpretation of these results is that repressive financial policies discrimi-
nate against private firms but favor SOEs, while foreign bank entry and competition
in banking may be viewed as a way to reverse the effects of financial repression.
Therefore, previously constrained private firms are able to increase investment and
18Varela (2016) provides evidence on this channel using firm-level data around the deregulation
of international financial flows in Hungary.
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sales when they get more access to bank credit. These results are consistent with
the financial constraint hypothesis. I consider that the coefficient estimate of the
foreign bank entry dummy β in equation (1.4) is a measure of the overall impact of
this financial market opening policy on private firms relative to state-owned firms.
On the one hand, the increase in loans could come directly from foreign banks, sug-
gesting that foreign banks directly contribute to credit supply. On the other hand,
even if only some firms can borrow from foreign banks, domestic banks could switch
customers and lend more to other firms in the same city. These firms could benefit
from foreign bank entry indirectly.
1.5.2.2 High-collateral vs. Low-collateral Firms
The availability of tangible assets that firms can pledge as collateral is impor-
tant in raising external funds in countries with less-developed financial markets. In
this subsection, I define firm-level collateral as the ratio between fixed assets and
total assets. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of the firm-level collateral ratio. 25%
of firms have a ratio of fixed assets to total assets lower than 20%, and the median
collateral ratio is 0.35.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of firm-level collateral ratio
Source: Author’s calculation based on Chinese Industrial Firm-level Data. Collateral
ratio is defined as firm-level fixed assets divided by total assets.
I test the effects of foreign bank deregulation on high-collateral firms’ credit
access and performance relative to that of low-collateral firms, using the following
equation:
Yi,c,j,t = αi+δc,j,t+βFBankc,t×Collaterali+λt×Collaterali+γXi,c,j,t+εi,c,j,t (1.5)
Here Collaterali is a continuous variable defined as the ratio between a firm’s
fixed assets and total assets in its initial year in the sample. The results suggest
that firms with less collateral before financial opening receive more benefits from
foreign bank entry reform in terms of significantly higher loan access. The differences
in sales, investment and TFP among firms with different collateral ratios are not
significant.
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Table 1.12: Firm performance and collateral availability
Dependent variable log(loans) log(sales) log(investment) log(TFP )
All cities (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign bank × Collateral -0.554*** -0.076 0.137 0.009
(0.087) (0.053) (0.230) (0.044)
FirmSizet−1 0.374*** 0.294*** -0.027 0.051***
(0.043) (0.024) (0.029) (0.012)
Profitabilityt−1 0.008 0.287*** 0.399*** 0.182***
(0.122) (0.060) (0.108) (0.056)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Collateral-time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered at city city city city
Observations 1,022,776 1,022,776 862,613 1,022,776
R-squared 0.797 0.895 0.722 0.747
Notes: This table reports the effects of foreign bank deregulation on performance of firms with
different levels of the collateral ratio. Firm-level “collateral” is defined as the ratio between fixed
assets and total assets. The dependent variables are firm’s loans, annual sales, investment and
TFP measured following Wooldridge (2009). Lagged firm size (total assets) and lagged
profitability (profit divided by revenue) are used as firm-level time-varying control variables. All
regressions control for firm and city-industry-year fixed effects, where industry classifications are
at the 2-digit SIC level. Foreign firms are not included in the sample. Clustered standard errors
(at city level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.5.2.3 High ROA vs. Low ROA firms
A natural question following a financial opening is whether foreign banks only
target the most profitable firms. If costs of screening domestic borrowers are high for
foreign banks, the high information costs may induce foreign banks to lend only to
the most profitable local firms (See Detragiache et al., 2008). Another relevant study
on firms’ profitability and foreign bank entry is Lin (2011). She analyses data from
listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and finds that more
profitable firms benefit more from foreign bank entry in China. The main difference
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relative to this chapter is that private firms listed on stock exchanges are generally
large and profitable, and they are arguably not subject to financial constraints.
Here I test whether the additional credit supply brought by foreign bank entry
has differential effects between profitable firms and unprofitable firms, using the
following specification.
Yi,c,j,t = αi+δc,j,t+βFBankc,t×HighROAi+λt×HighROAi+γXi,c,j,t+εi,c,j,t (1.6)
HighROAi is a pre-determined indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if
the average return on assets (ROA) of firm i is above the median (over all firms in
the same city) before the deregulation policy was adopted. Table 1.13 shows that
profitable firms increase investment and sales relative to unprofitable firms after
foreign bank entry, but take out fewer loans relative to unprofitable firms. This is
a bit different from Table 1.10. Although on average private firms received more
loans relative to state-owned firms after foreign bank entry, the results suggest that
(1) high-ROA firms can get loans at lower interest rates although the volume of
loans does not increase relative to low-ROA firms and (2) the increased investment
in these high-ROA firms may be supported by internal funds (retained earnings).
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Table 1.13: Firm performance and profitability (ROA)
Dependent variable log(loans) log(sales) log(investment) log(TFP )
All cities (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign bank ×HighROA -0.059*** 0.239*** 0.092*** 0.184***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014)
FirmSizet−1 0.355*** 0.258*** -0.096*** 0.043***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.017) (0.004)
Profitabilityt−1 0.098*** 0.407*** 0.450*** 0.220***
(0.029) (0.020) (0.042) (0.016)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ROA-time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered at city city city city
Observations 1,022,776 1,022,776 862,613 1,022,776
R-squared 0.717 0.889 0.526 0.730
Notes: This table reports the effects of foreign bank deregulation on the performance of firms
with different levels of return on assets (ROA). “HighROA” is a pre-determined indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 if the average return on assets (ROA) of the firm is above the median
(over all firms in the same city) before the deregulation policy was adopted. The dependent
variables are firm’s loans, annual sales, investment and TFP. Lagged firm size (total assets) and
lagged profitability (profit divided by revenue) are used as firm-level time-varying control
variables. All regressions control for firm and city-industry-year fixed effects, where industry
classifications are at the 2-digit SIC level. Foreign firms are not included in the sample.
Clustered standard errors (at city level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.5.2.4 High TFP vs. Low TFP firms
Return on assets may not be a good measure to identify “good firms”. Here I
also use estimated total factor productivity (TFP) to distinguish firms. In order to
avoid possible production function estimation biases commonly encountered in the
Solow residual and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimation approaches, I adopt the
methodology developed in Wooldridge (2009) to estimate firm-level TFP.19
19See Appendix A.5 for details on production function estimation.
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Similar to the previous section, I test whether foreign bank entry has differen-
tial effects across firms with different levels of TFP, using the following specification:
Yi,c,j,t = αi + δc,j,t + βFBankc,t × TFP i + λt× TFPi + γXi,c,j,t + εi,c,j,t (1.7)
where TFPi is a pre-determined variable that equals the estimated TFP of firm
i one year before the deregulation policy was adopted. The coefficient of interest
β tells us the differential effects of foreign bank entry according to various levels
of productivity. The regression results are reported in Table 1.14. Results show
that more productive firms have in increase in investment and sales relative to less
productive firms after foreign bank entry. However, there is no significant difference
between productive firms and unproductive firms for the increase of bank loans
following foreign bank entry. One possibility is that increased investment in high-
TFP firms are mainly supported by retained earnings.
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Table 1.14: Firm performance and productivity
Dependent variable log(loans) log(sales) log(investment)
All cities (1) (2) (3)
Foreign bank × TFPt−1 0.004 0.157*** 0.045**
(0.0055) (0.015) (0.021)
Firm sizet−1 0.342*** 0.257*** -0.066**
(0.039) (0.022) (0.026)
Profitabilityt−1 0.025 0.253*** 0.429***
(0.109) (0.049) (0.093)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes
TFP-time trend Yes Yes Yes
Clustered at city city city
Observations 1,022,776 1,022,776 862,613
R-squared 0.738 0.891 0.546
Notes: This table reports the effects of foreign bank deregulation on the performance of firms
with different levels of TFP. TFP is a pre-determined variable that equals the firm-level
estimated TFP one year before the deregulation policy was adopted, where TFP is measured
following the methodology by Wooldridge (2009). The dependent variables are firm’s loans,
annual sales and investment. Lagged firm size (total assets) and lagged profitability (profit
divided by revenue) are used as firm-level time-varying control variables. All regressions control
for firm and city-industry-year fixed effects, where industry classifications are at the 2-digit SIC
level. Foreign firms are not included in the sample. Clustered standard errors (at city level) in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Multiple interactions
In the final specification, I include all the interaction terms between foreign
bank deregulation and firm-level private ownership, collateral ratio, high ROA si-
multaneously to check the relative importance of each dimension of heterogeneity
among firms20. The regression results are reported in Table 1.15. These results
are consistent with most of the previous results when I include each dimension
of heterogeneity separately. For credit access, private-owned firms and firms with
20Firm-level TFP is highly correlated with ROA, so I omit the interaction term with TFP in
this specification.
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low collateral ratio obtained (relatively) more loans after foreign bank deregulation.
These relatively more loans correspond to relatively higher level of sales. Firms with
high ROA seem to take out fewer loans relative to unprofitable firms. However, only
firms with higher collateral ratio increased investment relative to other firms, the
relative effect of private ownership on investment is not significant once I control for
high ROA dummy and collateral ratio.
Table 1.15: Firm performance with multiple interactions
Dependent variable log(loans) log(sales) log(investment) log(TFP )
All cities (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign bank × Private 0.083** 0.006 0.012 0.019
(0.040) (0.021) (0.058) (0.020)
Foreign bank ×HighROA -0.057*** 0.258*** 0.056 0.271***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.034) (0.021)
Foreign bank × Collateral -0.577*** -0.157*** 2.610*** -0.545***
(0.096) (0.042) (0.325) (0.069)
Firm sizet−1 0.346*** 0.301*** -0.043** 0.042***
(0.039) (0.023) (0.021) (0.009)
Profitabilityt−1 0.017 0.299*** 0.398*** 0.130***
(0.116) (0.054) (0.090) (0.038)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered at city city city city
Observations 1,022,776 1,022,776 862,613 1,022,776
R-squared 0.806 0.898 0.738 0.758
Notes: This table reports the effects of foreign bank deregulation on the performance of firms
with different ownership, ROA and collateral ratio by including multiple interaction terms
simultaneously. The dependent variables are firm’s loans, annual sales, investment and TFP,
which is measured following the methodology by Wooldridge (2009). Lagged firm size (total
assets) and lagged profitability (profit divided by revenue) are used as firm-level time-varying
control variables. All regressions control for firm and city-industry-year fixed effects, where
industry classifications are at the 2-digit SIC level. Foreign firms are not included in the sample.
Clustered standard errors (at city level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1.5.3 Possible Channel: Increasing Banking Competition
The simple foreign bank entry dummy variable I use for empirical analysis
indicates whether each city is subject to actual as well as potential foreign bank entry.
Therefore, this dummy is associated with the extent of competition in the domestic
banking market. Recent studies find that foreign banks are more efficient than
domestic banks, and that foreign bank entry in China makes the banking market
more competitive.21 As a result, the coefficient estimate of the foreign bank entry
dummy could capture two channels through which financial opening policy could
affect firms: (1) directly through the increased banking activities (credit supply)
of the new foreign bank branches and (2) indirectly through increased competition
in banking. This competitive pressure could impact firms’ credit access and real
performance.
To investigate the correlation between foreign bank entry, banking competition
and firm-level outcomes, I apply a two-step method. First, I use provincial data in
China to regress a bank competition index (Comp) on foreign bank entry dummy
variables (Fbank). Second, I study the effect of the fitted value of this regression on
firms’ outcome variables. The two step model consists of the following two equations:
Comppt = αp + δt + βFbankpt + εpt (First Stage)
log(loans)icjt = αi+δc+φjt+γ1Comppt+γ2Comppt×Privatei+εicjt (SecondStage)
21See Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009) and Xu (2011).
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First stage: foreign bank entry and banking sector competition
In first stage equation, I measure the bank competition index as the NERI (Na-
tional Economic Research Institute) index of marketization for provinces in China.
The index measures the share of deposits and loans in non-state banks relative to
state-owned banks. I use this index to proxy the competitiveness of the local bank-
ing sector. For foreign bank entry at the province level, if there is at least one city
in province p allowing foreign banks to enter in year t, then I define Fbankpt = 1.
22
Figure 1.4 shows the variation of the bank competition index across provinces and
years. A higher number represents a higher presence of non-state banks (joint-stock
banks, city commercial banks and foreign banks) and a higher level of banking
competition in that province.
Figure 1.4: Distribution of province-level bank competition index
Source: NERI index of marketization in China. See Fan, Wang and Zhu (2010)
22Here province in China is similar to state in US, and city is similar to county in US. There are
31 provinces in China and 354 cities in China.
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Table 1.16 reports the first-stage results based on a province-level panel regres-
sion. The table shows that foreign bank entry indeed intensified banking competition
in the local financial market.
Table 1.16: First stage: foreign bank entry increases competition in banking sector
Dependent variable Bank competition index
Province-year panel (1) (2)






Year dummy Yes Yes
Province dummy Yes Yes
Observations 310 310
Number of provinces 31 31
R-squared 0.570 0.599
Second stage: banking sector competition and firm’s performance
In second stage equation, I use 2SLS to regress firm-level loans or investment
on the bank competition index, using foreign bank entry dummy as an instrument.
I include firm, city, and industry-year fixed effects. Including interactions of bank
competition with dummy variables for private and foreign-owned firms allows me to
investigate whether the impact of competition differs by firm type.
Empirical results of the second stage regression are reported in Table 1.17. The
table shows that increases in bank competition brought about by foreign bank entry
have differential effects across firms. There is a positive impact on private firms’
credit access and investment, relative to state-owned firms. There is no significant
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effect for foreign-owned firms relative to state-owned firms. The result for foreign
firms is consistent with the fact that foreign firms already had a high level of credit
access before the foreign bank deregulation. Foreign firms should not be affected
directly by increased competition after foreign bank entry.
Table 1.17: Second stage: predicted banking competition on firm’s outcome
Dependent variable log(loans) log(investment)
(1) (2)
Competition Index -0.148 -0.028
(0.097) (0.147)
Competition Index× 0.249*** 0.201**
Private dummy (0.085) (0.088)
Competition Index× 0.171 0.032
Foreign dummy (0.100) (0.139)




Firm FE Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes
Industry-year FE Yes Yes
Ownership-time trend Yes Yes
Clustered at city city
Observations 1,022,776 862,613
R-squared 0.729 0.553
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the city-level, are reported in parentheses, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Here I control for city and industry-year fixed effects (not
city-industry-year triple fixed effects), to identify the level effect from changes in the bank
competition index in addition to the differential effects from interaction terms.
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1.6 Robustness Checks
1.6.1 Financial Liberalization or Trade Liberalization in post-WTO period?
In this section, I investigate whether the estimated differential effects of for-
eign bank entry on state-owned firms and private firms in Section 1.5.2 should be
attributed to (possibly time-varying) regional trade shocks. Although the domestic
financial sector experienced increased foreign competition after China’s WTO acces-
sion (financial liberalization), China’s exports also increased rapidly following the
tariff decline at the same time (trade liberalization). Even if the timeline of tariff
declines was the same across cities in China, the impact of trade exposure could be
different across cities.
To address the possible threat to identification from trade liberalization, I
construct a time-varying trade openness index at the city-level using the average








where i, c, j, t stand for firm, city, industry, and time respectively. Then I
run the following regression to estimate the differential impacts of both foreign bank
entry and trade openness:
Yi,c,j,t = αi + φc,j,t + β1FBankc,t × Privatei + β2Tradec,t × Privatei + εi,c,j,t (1.8)
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Both the financial liberalization and trade liberalization shocks vary at the
city-year level. The results, reported in Table 1.18, show that after controlling
for city-level trade exposure, foreign bank deregulation still has larger impacts on
private firms relative to state-owned firms, in terms of credit access and investment.
The effects on private firms’ relative sales and TFP (Columns 2 and 4) are very
small and not significant.
One possible explanation for the negative coefficient of the trade openness
interaction term in the regression for bank loans (in Column (1)) is that private
firms could turn to trade credit as a substitute for bank loans once these firms are
more exposed to international trade. This robustness check suggests that the main
results in Section 5.2 are not driven by private firms being more exposed to export
opportunities after China joined the WTO, and that financial development did play
a role in explaining the relatively higher growth of credit access and investment
among private-owned firms.
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Table 1.18: Foreign bank entry vs. Trade openness
Dependent variable log(loans) log(sales) log(investment) log(TFP )
Sample: opened cities (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign bank × Private 0.075** 0.010 0.108** 0.011
(0.034) (0.019) (0.042) (0.028)
TradeOpenness× Private -0.011* 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.005)
Firm sizet−1 0.340*** 0.302*** -0.034 0.048***
(0.039) (0.023) (0.024) (0.008)
Profitabilityt−1 0.014 0.305*** 0.382*** 0.157***
(0.119) (0.060) (0.097) (0.049)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered at city city city city
Observations 295,229 312,772 205,867 295,229
Adj. R-squared 0.736 0.895 0.546 0.665
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions including a city-level trade openness index
to address the threat to identification from trade liberalization. City-level time varying trade
openness is defined as the average export value per worker in the manufacturing sector within the
city. The dependent variables are the firm’s loans, annual sales, investment and TFP measured
following the methodology in Wooldridge (2009). Lagged firm size (total assets) and lagged
profitability (profit divided by revenue) are used as firm-level time-varying control variables. All
regressions control for firm and city-industry-year fixed effects, where industry classifications are
at the 2-digit SIC level. Foreign firms are not included in the sample. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the city-level, are reported in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.6.2 Alternative Sample of Cities
An implicit identifying assumption is that the timing of the opening for foreign
bank entry in different cities is exogenous, conditional on other observable character-
istics of the cities. However, it is likely that the details of China’s foreign bank entry
policy were endogenously determined, and that “other cities” without foreign bank
access may not form a good control group for the “opened cities” in the regression
analysis. When all cities are included in the baseline regressions, the results may
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only pick up unobserved differences between the “opened cities” and “other cities”
rather than the impact of allowing foreign banks to enter.23
To examine whether the timing of opening up for foreign bank entry is related
to the observable characteristics of different cities, I estimate a simple probit model
across cities where the dependent variable takes value 1 for “opened cities” (defined
as cities where foreign banks were allowed before the end of 2006, see Figure 1.5)
and 0 otherwise.
Figure 1.5: Opened cities with foreign bank entry during 2001-2006 in mainland
China
23However, in the differential impact regressions with interaction terms between foreign bank
entry and the firm’s type, I can control for city-year fixed effects to control for different time effects
across cities.
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The explanatory variables include city-level population, GDP per capita, and
utilized foreign capital (a proxy for foreign direct investment in the city). These
city-level variables are obtained from China’s City Statistics Yearbook, and they
are measured over 1998-2000, before China’s WTO accession. The probit regression
results, in terms of marginal effects, are reported in Table 1.19. These results show
that, before China’s WTO accession, the “opened regions” were larger in terms of
population, GDP per capita and foreign direct investment. The results suggest that
we may not take the choice of the “opened cities” as completely exogenous. To
address this concern, I conduct two robustness checks.
Table 1.19: Whether the city is opened for foreign banks before 2006: Probit esti-
mation
Dependent variable “Opened city”=1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log population 0.097** 0.096***
(0.043) (0.025)
Log GDP per capita 0.178*** 0.146***
(0.029) (0.039)
Log FDI ($ million) 0.077*** 0.027**
(0.009) (0.013)
Observations 213 213 213 213
Notes: This table reports the correlation between city-level characteristics (including population,
GDP per capita, and total foreign direct investment) and whether the city was chosen to allow
foreign bank entry before the end of 2006 based on the probit regression. Dependent variable
takes a value of 1 for cities opened up before 2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results Based on “Opened Cities” Only
First, I simply restrict my sample to the “opened cities”, defined as cities where
foreign banks were allowed before the end of 2006, as a robustness check. There are
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20 cities considered as “opened cities” (as listed in Table 1.1), out of 213 cities in
the sample. The number of observations drops to around one quarter of the full
sample when I restrict my sample to the opened cities only. Table 1.20 reports the
differential effects of foreign bank entry between private firms and SOEs using the
sub-sample with opened cities. These regression results are similar to those reported
in Table 1.11, and the coefficients for sales and investment are larger when I focus
only on opened cities, compared with the coefficients from full sample estimation.
Table 1.20: Firm’s performance (SOE vs. POE) based on “Opened Cities”
Dependent variable log(loans) log(sales) log(investment) log(TFP )
Opened cities only (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign bank × Private 0.046*** 0.057*** 0.122*** -0.002
(0.019) (0.006) (0.021) (0.020)
Firm sizet−1 0.303*** 0.352*** 0.026*** 0.048***
(0.036) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010)
Profitabilityt−1 0.022 0.736*** 0.908*** 0.158***
(0.044) (0.013) (0.041) (0.047)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
POE-time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered at city city city city
Observations 210,270 210,270 142,701 210,270
R-squared 0.726 0.923 0.669 0.676
Notes: This table reports the effects of foreign bank deregulation on private firms’ performance
relative to that of SOEs based on the sample of “opened cities” only. The dependent variables are
firm’s loan access (proxied by short term liabilities minus accounts payable), annual sales,
investment and TFP measured following Wooldridge (2009). All regressions control for
city-industry-year fixed effects, where industry classifications are at the 2-digit SIC level. Only 20
“opened” cities where foreign banks were allowed before 2006 are included in the sample.
Clustered standard errors (at city level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Propensity Score Matching at City-level
Second, after the probit estimation, I also use propensity score matching at the
city level to identify a matched control group of“other cities”, which have comparable
pre-WTO accession characteristics as“opened cities”. 24 Then I re-estimate the main
regressions using this “matched control group” and “opened cities” as the regression
sample.
In particular, this matched control group includes 14 cities: Dongguan, Han-
dan, Hangzhou, Jieyang, Quanzhou, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Taizhou, Tangshan,
Weihai, Wuxi, Yantai, Zhenjiang, and Zibo. These cities have comparable observable
characteristics as those of 20 opened cities except for Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai,
Shenzhen, and Tianjin. I run the same probit model as in Table 1.19 to see whether
observable characteristics are associated with the status of being an “opened city”
within this group of 29 cities (15 opened cities excluding the five largest, plus 14
matched controlled cities). I find that the coefficients of the observable characteris-
tics are statistically insignificant. Note that we cannot find cities with comparable
characteristics as those of Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Tianjin.
These five “opened cities” are excluded in this robustness exercise, so the results
should not be attributed to the five largest cities where pre-existing foreign bank
presence prior to 2001 could mix up with the deregulation policy.
The regression results using the sample of open and matched control cities
are reported in Table 1.21. Results are generally similar to those reported in Table
24I follow the same matching methodology in Lai et al. (2016)to identify matched cities.
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1.11. These estimates suggest that my baseline results are unlikely to be driven by
differences across “opened cities” and “other cities”.
Table 1.21: Firm’s performance (SOE vs. POE) based on sample of matched cities
Dependent variable log(loans) log(sales) log(investment) log(TFP )
Matched cities (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign bank × Private 0.074** 0.080** 0.091** -0.003
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.028)
Firm sizet−1 0.276*** 0.658*** -0.124*** 0.055***
(0.032) (0.013) (0.032) (0.009)
Profitabilityt−1 0.058 1.035*** 0.221** 0.148***
(0.059) (0.147) (0.097) (0.037)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
POE-time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered at city city city city
Observations 225,971 225,971 149,085 225,971
R-squared 0.726 0.923 0.507 0.711
Notes: This table reports the effects of foreign bank deregulation on private firms’ performance
relative to that of SOEs based on the sample of 15 opened cities excluding the five largest, plus
14 matched controlled cities. The dependent variables are firm’s loan access (proxied by short
term liability minus accounts payable), annual sales, investment and TFP measured following
Wooldridge (2009). All regressions control for city-industry-year fixed effects, where industry
classifications are at 2-digit level according to SIC. Clustered standard errors (at city level) in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.6.3 Robustness Check: Pre-existing Trend Tests
The results so far suggest that foreign bank entry has differential effects across
different types of firms. However, it is possible that state-owned firms and private-
owned firms had different trends before foreign bank entry, in which case changes in
firms’ performance cannot necessarily be attributed to foreign bank entry. In this
additional robustness check, I do not include differential trends between private-
owned and state-owned firms to test pre-existing trend. The growth of private-owned
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firms may also affect the timing of foreign bank deregulation. Perhaps Chinese
government relaxed foreign bank restrictions anticipating faster growth in private
firms and the need to finance attractive projects, leading to a reverse causality
problem. Here I conduct placebo tests to see whether future foreign bank entry
affects firms’ current outcomes. The OLS specification is as follows:







c,t × Privatei + γXi,c,j,t + εi,c,j,t
where I allow for τ lags Afterτc,t (post-treatment effects) and leads Before
τ
c,t
(anticipatory effects) for the actual foreign bank entry policy variable FBankc,t. In
Table 1.22, coefficients of the one-period-led Before interaction term are insignifi-
cant. Results show that relative to state-owned firms, private-owned firms are more
likely to have higher investment and sales either in the year of or after foreign bank
entry. The findings suggest that the results in the main regressions in the previ-
ous section do not suffer from the problem of reverse causality. This also addresses
concerns that China’s central government may have chosen cities with more rapidly
growing privately-owned firms for earlier foreign bank deregulation policy.
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Table 1.22: Pre-existing trend tests
Dependent variable log(investment) log(sales)
Opened cities, 1998-2007 (1) (2)
[OneY ear Before] × Private 0.058 0.028
(0.038) (0.021)
[OneY ear After] × Private 0.099*** 0.050***
(0.029) (0.010)
[TwoY earsAfter] × Private 0.094** 0.053***
(0.045) (0.018)
Firm FE Yes Yes
City-year FE Yes Yes
Industry-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 276,308 515,723
R-squared 0.542 0.924
Notes: Table 1.22 shows firm-level regressions using before and after dummies. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter studies the impact of foreign bank deregulation following China’s
WTO accession on firms’ performance. The geographic and time series variation in
the policy of foreign bank lending in China offers a suitable setting for identifying
the relationship between foreign bank entry and domestic firms’ real activities. On
average, foreign bank entry in its early stage did not have a significant impact on
city-level investment and output. However, the impact differed across ownership
groups. The additional credit supply brought by foreign bank entry had a larger
impact on investment and sales among private firms compared with state-owned
firms.
The findings suggest that the banking sector liberalization policy helped allevi-
ate financial constraints of firms, especially those without political connections. The
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liberalization policy may have helped reduce the inefficiency in resource allocation
due to state-owned banks’ discrimination against private firms in bank lending. In
an economy with seriously repressive financial policies, which is a reasonable depic-
tion of the current situation in the China, the state sector is often strongly favored,
while the private sector is discriminated against. Introduction of foreign banks re-
duces the effect of repressive policies and therefore should reverse previous policy
effects.
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Chapter 2: Why do Firms in Emerging Europe Borrow in Foreign
Currency? The Role of Interest Rate Differentials
2.1 Introduction
Unhedged foreign currency (FX) borrowing is widely alleged to be one of the
major causes of the severe financial crisis that hit many emerging markets in 1980’s
and 1990’s1. Recently, foreign currency borrowing has also expanded rapidly in
emerging Europe, especially during the pre-crisis boom2. Figure 2.1 shows that the
share of foreign currency lending in total lending reached well above 50% in most
emerging European economies, which was substantially higher than the shares in
other regions. Retail loans, including residential mortgages, other consumer credit
and small business loans, take a large share of FX borrowing in these countries.
These clients are typically more vulnerable and have only local currency income and
assets; as a result, the associated currency mismatch could be a problem for financial
stability and economic growth.
1Currency mismatch was an important aspect of the Mexico crisis in 1994 and the East Asian
crisis in 1997-98. See Mishkin (1999) and Aguiar (2005).
2In this chapter, “Emerging Europe” refers to non-Eurozone emerging countries in Central and
Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia. See Appendix B for a discussion on trend of local vs.
foreign currency borrowing in other emerging markets. “Foreign currency” refers to US dollar, Euro
and Swiss francs in this chapter.
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Policy makers in Eastern Europe fear that foreign currency borrowing could
lead to widespread credit default and the destabilization of the financial sector.
Particularly, they worry about borrowing by retail clients, since these small firm
entrepreneurs and households seek lower interest rates and take unhedged exchange
rate risks. As a response, authorities in Eastern Europe have started to take mea-
sures to reduce foreign currency borrowing in the private sector.3 Before implement-
ing regulations to discourage foreign currency borrowing, it is crucial to provide
micro-evidence documenting which firms are exposed to risk from foreign currency
loans and what this exposure may imply in terms of a firm’s performance. This
chapter provides relevant firm-level evidence in emerging Europe.
In this chapter, I study the determinants and consequences of foreign currency
borrowing by small firms in these emerging economies. My main data source is
the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) from the
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank4.
BEEPS is a cross-country firm-level survey which covers representative samples of
firms in 28 transition countries in Emerging Europe, mainly focusing on small non-
listed firms. Most important for my analysis in this chapter, the survey identifies
whether loans granted to firms are denominated in domestic or foreign currency.
Another advantage of this survey is the representativeness of the sample. The com-
prehensive coverage of the survey allows me to look at the determinants and impacts
3For example, banks are now forced to fully disclose the exchange rate risks involved in FX
borrowing and have had to tighten eligibility criteria for FX loans in Hungary, Poland and Latvia.
Ukraine even completely banned foreign currency lending to households in 2009 (Brown and De
Hass, 2010).
4See section 3 for a detailed description of dataset.
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of FX borrowing on a more representative set of firms. In this sense this chapter
complements the existing literature.5 In this study, I include small and medium
firms, which constitute the majority of firms in the economy and can potentially be
more vulnerable to unhedged exchange rate risk.



































































Source: IMF, Database of Vulnerability Exercise
Bank loans in foreign currency in % of total bank loans, 2007
Briefly speaking, currency mismatch plays a dual role in emerging markets.
There is a trade-off between cheaper credit and currency mismatch risk for FX bor-
rowers. On the one hand, the productive sector in these developing economies needs
external finance to fund investments that contribute to output growth. One stylized
fact is that much of the external finance from foreign bank lending is denominated in
foreign currency. Foreign currency borrowing has been an engine of growth that has
helped firms to reduce interest costs and relax borrowing constraints. On the other
hand, extensive and possibly excessive use of dollar debt in the pre-crisis years has
5For example, Aguiar (2005) and Bleakley and Cowan (2008) use data of publicly listed firms,
which are generally large and well-established.
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been a common threat in emerging market crises over the past two decades. The re-
sulting currency mismatch on the balance sheet has been singled out as an important
factor causing and amplifying crises (for example, see Aghion et al., 2000; Caballero
and Krishnamurthy, 2003). A borrower’s assets and revenues are mostly in domestic
currency, but currency depreciation magnifies liabilities and debt repayment obliga-
tions that are mostly in dollars, leading to a drop in net worth and investment. For
example, Aguiar (2005) finds that firm-level investment was adversely affected by
the 1994 peso devaluation in Mexico, especially among firms with high levels of for-
eign currency debt. Bordo et al. (2010) show that historically when a country has a
greater proportion of foreign currency debt, this country also has a higher frequency
of financial crises and larger permanent output losses. Therefore, systemic risk in
emerging markets will be high when small firms, in addition to large internationally
active firms, take on dollar debt, resulting in correlated defaults in a downturn.
I investigate whether firms that take on currency mismatch, especially those
more likely to be financially constrained, enjoy better borrowing conditions and grow
faster in the period when vulnerabilities build up.6 There are two major channels
through which foreign currency borrowing can affect firms’ performance before the
crisis. One is lowering of the user cost of capital and the other is the easing of
liquidity constraints.7 I can test the relevance of the latter channel by allowing het-
erogeneous effects for various sub-groups of firm, with presumably different levels of
liquidity constraints. Small, domestic and non-trading firms are usually presumed
6Currently most of the periods covered by survey data are in non-crisis time, therefore my
results at this stage are more related to the tranquil time.
7Failure of UIP results in lower user cost for foreign currency loans.
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to be more liquidity constrained. Therefore, to test the importance of the liquidity
constraint easing channel, I use estimations relating firm outcomes to interactions
between indicator variables for FX borrowing with measures of size, foreign owner-
ship or exporting status. The regression analysis suggests that currency mismatch
reduces the interest rate on loans by 2 percentage points on average, after controlling
for firm-level and loan-level characteristics that would affect the cost of borrowing.
The results shed light on the relation of foreign currency borrowing to interest rate
differentials. In the pre-crisis time between 2004 and 2007, results also show that
firms with currency mismatches exhibit faster sales growth and higher investment
rates.
Furthermore, I study whether exposure to foreign currency loans affects a
firm’s growth rate during crisis episodes relative to firms without foreign currency
liabilities. Using the most recent wave of the BEEPS survey and comparing the
within-firm sales growth rates from 2008 to 2011 across different types of firms, I
find that firms with currency mismatches exhibit significantly lower sales growth
relative to firms with no foreign currency liability, controlling for total loans. The
results suggest there is evidence for a negative balance sheet effect during crises in
firms with foreign currency liabilities.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related
literature. Section 2.3 describes the survey data I use, while Sections 2.4 and 2.5
discuss the empirical specifications and report results on the firm-level empirical
analysis. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Related Literature
Why do firms borrow in foreign currency?
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999)document that a large part of borrowing in
emerging markets is intermediated in dollars. Why do firms borrow in foreign cur-
rency? There are many studies on currency choice when firms borrow from financial
institutions or investors, focusing on both the borrower and lender incentives.
On the lender side, much of foreign currency lending is from foreign lenders
who lend in dollars and would demand a premium if they were to lend in local
currency (Hausmann and Panizza, 2010). Since governments in emerging markets
may be tempted to devalue local currency and reduce their real debt burdens, foreign
lenders choose to lend in dollars anticipating the devaluation behavior. Shin (2013)
also documents that changing patterns of financial intermediation, from the banking
sector to capital markets, and from banks to long-term investors in international debt
issuance.
On the borrower side, one main advantage of borrowing in foreign currency
is the lower interest rate on dollar loans. Uncovered interest rate parity can fail
in reality. Therefore, lower interest rates on dollar loans give firms an incentive
to borrow in dollars.8 Allayannis et al. (2003) and Cowan (2006) use firm-level
panel data to investigate the link between loan currency and firm characteristics,
controlling for macro and institutional variables, in East Asia and Latin America,
8I use the terms “dollar” and “foreign currency” interchangeably throughout this chapter unless
explicitly separating dollar and euro borrowing.
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respectively. They find that interest rate differentials are positively related to foreign
currency borrowing. However, the cheaper dollar debt comes at the cost of currency
mismatch risk on the borrower’s balance sheet.
The second strand of literature argues that firms have hedging motives for
incurring dollar debt. Exporting firms who have dollar revenue from exports or FDI
operations are more likely to borrow in foreign currency. Bleakley and Cowan (2008)
find that firms match the currency of liabilities to the exchange rate sensitivity of
revenues. Allayannis et al. (2003) and Aguiar (2005) also provide empirical evidence
that exporters are more likely to have dollar debt. Moreover, recent work by Kamil
(2012) investigates the effect of various exchange rate regimes on firms’ incentives
to hedge currency risk.
FX borrowing and balance sheet effects
Large inflows of foreign debt can be problematic to emerging markets9. There
are many studies that emphasize the balance sheet channel (or collateral channel).
In an open economy setting, Céspedes et al. (2004) argue that debt denominated in
foreign currency is a central protagonist behind EM financial crises. The key mech-
anism is that a depreciation inflates the peso value of dollar debt and the resulting
weakening of balance sheet positions prevents firms from investing and expanding.
In the empirical literature, many of the studies on the effect of FX borrowing and
9 Forbes and Warnock (2013) find most extreme capital flow episodes, e.g. surges and stops,
are driven by debt flows. Mendoza and Terrones (2008) document that credit boom from foreign
borrowing lead to crises.
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the associated balance sheets effects following depreciation have focused on large
and publicly traded firms. The data choice is mainly determined by the availabil-
ity of data on the currency composition of debt. However, it may be that smaller,
non-public firms are even more sensitive to balance sheet effects.
The existing empirical evidence on the effect of FX borrowing is mixed. Aguiar
(2005) shows that firms with heavy exposure to short-term foreign currency debt
before the Mexican crisis decreased investment during the crisis compared to firms
with lower dollar debt. Similarly, Bleakley and Cowan (2008) study corporate dollar
debt and depreciation for listed firms in Latin America during the period 1991-1999.
They conclude that balance sheet effects associated with currency mismatch are
relatively minor. They find that firms holding more dollar debt do not invest less
than their peso-indebted counterparts following a depreciation. One recent study,
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2016), quantifies the effects of the lending channel and balance
sheet channel on corporate investment, by comparing performances of foreign-owned
and domestic exporters during currency crises and “twin” crises, defined as banking
crisis and currency crisis both occurred. They find there is a difference in investment
between foreign and domestic exporters only under twin crises when liquidity is
scarce. There is evidence for a balance sheet channel effect, but the lending channel
is a more important factor hindering investment.
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Foreign currency borrowing by small non-listed firms
Much of the literature on the impact of currency mismatch on firms’ perfor-
mance uses listed firm data and finds that balance sheet effects are small. Com-
plementing the above studies, I focus on foreign currency borrowing by small firms,
rather than the currency denomination of outstanding corporate debt of large cor-
porations. Brown et al. (2011) is the first paper using the sample of east European
firms from BEEPS to study FX borrowing by small firms. They focus on the de-
terminants of foreign currency borrowing by small firms between 2002 and 2005,
and find that foreign currency borrowing is more strongly correlated with firm-level
foreign currency revenues than with country-level interest rate differentials10.
This chapter differs from their paper in two dimensions. First, I examine
the impact of foreign currency borrowing on firm-level growth as well as investment
rather than just the determinants of currency choice. Therefore, the foreign currency
dummy variable is not only used as the dependent variable but also as a right-hand
side variable in regressions. Second, I use interest rate data at the firm level to
document the interest rate differential between local currency loans and foreign cur-
rency loans, rather than studying the effect of country-level interest rate differentials
on foreign currency borrowing. I control for country-level interest rate differentials
using country-year fixed effects. The results show that foreign currency borrowing
indeed reduces interest rates at the loan level across financially constrained firms.
10Following their methodology, I also examine on determinants of FX borrowing using the recent
2012-2013 data in this chapter to extend their study.
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2.3 BEEPS Firm-level Data
Firm-level data was obtained from the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS). The European Bank of Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD) and the World Bank jointly conducted this survey in 2002, 2005,
2008 and 2013, and it is available through World Bank Enterprise Survey database11.
This firm-level survey is based on face-to-face interviews with managers, with the
goal being to collect information about the business environment and how it affects
the performance of plants across emerging economies.
Data coverage
BEEPS includes countries in east Europe and central Asia, most of which are
transition countries. The list of countries and the number of firms interviewed in each
country are reported in Table 2.1. The number of firms covered in each country is
roughly proportional to the total number of firms in that country. Interviewed firms
in each country are carefully selected to be representative of the targeted population.
The sampling methodology is stratified random sampling with replacement 12.
Table 2.2 presents the share of employment accounted for by firms belonging
in three size categories in 10 selected countries. I compare the distribution in the
BEEPS survey sample with the sample in Amadeus13. For the 10 selected countries
11BEEPS is a repeated cross-sectional data, not a panel data, but the survey collects historical
data on firms’ sales and foreign currency borrowing. Recent round BEEPS data of 2012-2013 is
available online on December 2014.
12Appendix 3 provides detailed discussion on the representativeness of this survey.
13The employment shares across firm sizes in Amadeus come from Larrain and Stumpner (2013).
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Table 2.1: Number of observations and share of foreign currency borrowers: By
country
Country Obs. FX% in loans Country Obs. FX% in loans
Albania 732 69% Latvia 652 24%
Armenia 896 28% Lithuania 681 29%
Azerbaijan 900 17% Moldova 887 29%
Belarus 848 28% Montenegro 154 14%
Bosnia 743 39% Poland 1,930 16%
Bulgaria 1,853 27% Romania 1,396 40%
Croatia 1,160 29% Russia 2,111 21%
Czech Republic 861 7% Serbia 900 18%
Estonia 662 29% Slovakia 665 18%
Macedonia 736 42% Slovenia 687 26%
Georgia 747 64% Tajikistan 736 25%
Hungary 1,151 24% Turkey 2,475 28%
Kazakhstan 1,379 27% Ukraine 1,908 23%
Kyrgyzstan 610 41% Uzbekistan 926 16%
Total 29,386 25%
Source: BEEPS: 2002, 2005 and 2009
covered by Amadeus, the comparison shows that BEEPS achieves representativeness
in terms of the size of firms.
Variables
The survey contains a variety of firm-level information, such as share of revenue
from exporting, foreign ownership percentage, share of investment financed by debt,
loan applications, and so on. Definitions of main variables are presented in Table
2.3. Table 2.4 provides brief summary statistics on the share of firms by their size,
ownership, and other characteristics, and by country. The survey tried to achieve
representativeness in terms of the size of firms. Specifically, around 70% of the
firms surveyed are “small” (less than 20 workers), 20% of the firms surveyed are
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Table 2.2: Employment distribution across different size bins
Country Source 1-49 employees 50-249 employees 250+ employees
Bulgaria BEEPS 0.08 0.30 0.62
Amadeus 0.12 0.26 0.61
Czech Republic BEEPS 0.04 0.26 0.70
Amadeus 0.08 0.29 0.63
Estonia BEEPS 0.20 0.32 0.48
Amadeus 0.32 0.37 0.30
Hungary BEEPS 0.05 0.28 0.67
Amadeus 0.04 0.36 0.59
Latvia BEEPS 0.10 0.41 0.48
Amadeus 0.06 0.40 0.54
Lithuania BEEPS 0.12 0.35 0.53
Amadeus 0.10 0.35 0.55
Poland BEEPS 0.06 0.15 0.79
Amadeus 0.03 0.30 0.67
Romania BEEPS 0.18 0.22 0.60
Amadeus 0.20 0.27 0.53
Russia BEEPS 0.03 0.17 0.80
Amadeus 0.08 0.19 0.72
Ukraine BEEPS 0.04 0.16 0.80
Amadeus 0.01 0.15 0.84
Note: This table reports the employment distribution across different size bins for 10 countries in
the BEEPS dataset in 2002 and 2005, and in the Amadeus dataset during 1996-2005.
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Table 2.3: Key Variable definitions
Variable name Definition Source
Loan characteristics
Currency denomination 1=loan in FX, 0=loan in local currency BEEPS
Collateral 1=loan is collateralized, 0 otherwise BEEPS
Maturity maturity of loan (in months) at lending date BEEPS
Interest rate Interest rate reported, in percentage BEEPS
Firm characteristics
FX borrower 1=having an outstanding FX loan, 0 otherwise BEEPS
Export share share of revenue from exporting activity BEEPS
Foreign ownership % owned by foreigners BEEPS
Debt finance share of investment financed by debt BEEPS
No. of employees Firm size: <100 (small); >100 (large) BEEPS
Years of operation age of firm BEEPS
Sales Total annual sales last fiscal year (in logs) BEEPS
Investment Total investment last fiscal year (in logs) BEEPS
Sector Classification by sector (ISIC code) BEEPS
Macro conditions
Depreciation depreciation of local currency vs. Euro, in % IFS
Inflation consumer price inflation, in % IFS
Peg 1=country with peg regime, 0 otherwise AREAER
Data source: BEEPS: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey in 2002, 2005
and 2008 by EBRD and World Bank. IFS: International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
AREAER: Annual report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions of the IMF.
“medium”, and only around 10% of the firms surveyed are “large” (more than 100
workers). Only 6% of surveyed firms are public listed firms, 30% of surveyed firms
have a positive exporting share in revenue, and 11% of surveyed firms are foreign
owned (more than 50% foreign ownership).
The main advantage in this survey data is that it covers not only stock-market
listed but also non-listed firms in emerging European economies, and it also reports
the currency denomination of each firms’ loans on their books.14 94% of the firms
14In the 2005, 2008 and 2012 survey, firms only report the currency denomination of their last



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































surveyed in data sample are non-listed firms. Since the sample of listed firms is a
biased sample of large privileged firms, a broader coverage enables us to conduct
research across the entire economy, not just the prime listed firms as in much of the
previous literature. However, the major shortcoming of this survey is that very few
financial statement variables are recorded, compared to the data available for listed
firms from other sources. It is not possible to obtain financial statement data for
the this sample of firms from standard sources. Less than 10% of the firms surveyed
report that they have issued private or public equity. Therefore, I have to focus on
the characteristics of firms, and analyze the effects of FX borrowing across subsets
of firms.
Loan currency
Most importantly for my analysis, the BEEPS surveys ask whether firms have
borrowed in foreign currency. Most of the foreign currency borrowings is in Euros
or US dollars. Table 2.1 shows the shares of foreign currency borrowers among total
firms in each country. Across all countries, 25% of the observations have borrowed
in foreign currency. The share of FX borrowers varies from 7% to 69% across
countries. Liability dollarization appears to be associated with more rigid exchange
rate regimes on average. For example, countries with currency boards or rigid pegs
(e.g. Estonia and Latvia) had a larger share of FX borrowing than countries with
floating exchange rates (e.g. Czech Republic and Slovakia)15.
15See Rosenberg and Tirpak (2008) for determinants of FX borrowing in the new EU member
states.
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In BEEPS 2005, 2009 and 2013, loan information is available in 5430 firms.
For each firm with at least one loan, BEEPS asks for detailed information about the
most recent loan, including currency denomination, whether collateral is provided,
maturity in months, and reported interest rate. This is one limitation of the dataset
since there is no information about the foreign currency share in total loans. 16
Table 2.5 displays the characteristics of firms with local and foreign currency loans.
The tables suggests that firms with foreign currency loans differ systematically from
those with only local currency loans. Firms with foreign currency loans are more
likely to have revenue from exporting activity, and foreign owners. There is no
clear relationship between loan currency and whether the firm is small (less than
100 employees). Table 2.5 also provides statistics on loan characteristics. Collateral
requirements for firms do not seem different between firms with local or foreign
currency loans. However, foreign currency loans have a significantly longer maturity
(sample mean: 44 months vs. 31 months), are larger on average and have lower
interest rates.
Credit demand and constraints
For the purpose of estimating the liquidity easing channel of foreign currency
lending, I also focus on information about credit constraints faced by firms. The
survey data allow me to directly observe firms’ access to finance. Specifically, I
observe whether firms’ loan application was approved or turned down, and whether
16The survey information on the last loan may be more reliable than information on the debt
stock, with the latter possibly based on the memory rather than on actual data. Similarly, the
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) also asks only the information on the last loan.
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Table 2.5: Characteristics by loan currency (Sampling weights included)
All Firms Firms with Firms with
Firms with loan LC loan FX loan
Observations 15,902 5,430 3,955 1,475
Exporter 0.18 0.25 0.22 0.34
Foreign firm 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.09
Small firm 0.87 0.81 0.81 0.82
Firm Age 14.75 15.83 15.60 16.45
Loan characteristics based on most recent loan
t-value All loans LC loans FX loans
Collateralized 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.79
Interest rate 8.07*** 6.20 6.68 5.10
Maturity 8.02*** 34.68 30.80 44.42
Loan size 6.40*** 1,030 442 2,468
Note: Loan size: in thousand Euros. Exchange rate data corresponds the conversion rate at the
month when the loan is received. Maturity: in months.
Table 2.6: Main reason for not applying for loan
Main Reason Obs. Type
No need for a loan 7481 no need loan
Application procedures are complex 666 constrained
Interest rates are not favorable 1889 constrained
Collateral requirements are too high 421 constrained
Size of loan and maturity are insufficient 114 constrained
Did not think it would be approved 190 constrained
Data source: BEEPS (2012).
firms are discouraged from applying for bank credit. One survey question asks:
“What is the main reason for not applying for any line of credit or loan?”. Table 2.6
lists the main reasons. Firms are classified as having no need for a loan or credit
constrained based on the answers. The answers suggest that high interest rates are
the main barrier to loan applications. Table 2.7 presents a summary by country
of the shares of firms that need a loan, and the share of constrained firms among















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.1 Probability of Having a FX Loan
I examine determinants of loan currency in the following empirical model. The
dependent variable Pr(FXLoan)i,j,t is the probability that a firm i in country j has
a foreign currency denominated loan conditional on receiving a loan at time t (the
sample only includes firms that have a loan):
Pr(FX Loan)i,j,t = αj,t + β1FirmControli,j + β2LoanControli,j,t + εi,j,t (2.1)
where FirmControli,j is a vector of characteristics of firm i in country j,
LoanControli,j,t are the characteristics of the loan taken by firm i in country j at
time t, and εi,j,t is the error term. The variable αj,t represents sector, country or
country-sector fixed effects.
A firm’s decision to take a foreign currency loan should be related to the
currency denomination of its revenues. I use three indicators to proxy for firm’s
revenue currency denomination: Exporter, Sales to multinationals and Foreign firm.
The dummy variable Exporter equals one if the firm exports and zero if the firm
obtains revenue only from domestic sales. Finally, the probability of a firm receiving
a foreign currency loan may depend on loan characteristics such as maturity and
collateralization. Therefore I include loan-level variables Maturity and Collateral as
controls in my empirical exercise.
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2.4.2 Interest Rate Differential on Loans: Is FX Borrowing Cheaper?
Low interest rates on major hard currencies (e.g. US dollar) provide a major
incentive for firms to substitute foreign currency credit for local currency credit.
Figure 2.2 plots the Fed Fund Rate (FFR) between Jan-2007 and Dec-2009. The
rate goes down from 5.3% in July 2007 to almost zero in January 2009. This sharp
decline in dollar rates could be viewed as an exogenous global liquidity shock to
emerging markets such as East Europe. This decline did translate to cheaper rate
on foreign currency loans.
The transmission of global monetary ease to these emerging economies starts
with low short-term rates, low bond yields and pressure for currency appreciation,
and contributes to a rapid growth in foreign currency credit to firms in East Europe.
I study how interest rate differentials at the micro level responded to the interna-
tional environment with low US interest rates. The important empirical question is:
can borrowing in foreign currency indeed reduce firms’ interest rate, and does this
benefit firms even taking depreciation risk into consideration?
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Figure 2.2: Low interest rate in US dollar since 2007
Source: FRED
In my firm-level dataset, each firm reports information about their most recent
loan, including the interest rate, currency denomination, maturity and collateral re-
quirement. I regress the reported interest rate on the currency denomination of
each loan and firm and loan specific controls, using the specification in equation
(2.2). To control for the fact that differences in interest rates between domestic
and foreign currency loans may reflect the expected rate of currency depreciation,
I adjusted domestic currency interest rates for expected currency depreciation by
using one-year ahead currency forecast data from Bloomberg. The dependent vari-
able Adj. Interest ratei,c,j,t is the depreciation adjusted real interest rate for firm i,
in country c, in sector j and at time t:
Adj. Interest ratei,c,j,t = β1ForeignCurrencyi,c,j,t + β2FirmControl (2.2)
+β3LoanControl + φj,t + ϕc,t + εi,c,j,t
where “Foreign Currency” is a dummy variable to differentiate loans with dif-
ferent currencies, and“firm control” and “loan control” are sets of control variables at
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the firm/loan level. Specifically, I include sales and years of operation as firm-level
control variables to capture the impact of size and existing history on the terms of
borrowing.17 I also consider “foreign ownership” as a firm level measure of access
to liquidity, especially during financial crisis. Foreign-owned firms are likely to have
better access to international markets and are less constrained, because they can
draw funds from the parent company through internal capital market lending. Less
financially constrained firms would be more likely to borrow at a lower interest rate.
For loan specific variables, I add the maturity of the loan to the regression, since
generally interest rates would depend on maturity. Additional controls on collateral
capture the effect of collateral requirements on interest rates. 18 Country-year and
sector-year fixed effects are included in the estimation.
2.4.3 Growth, Investment and FX Exposure
The impact of FX lending on firm’s performance before the crisis
I use sales growth and investment rates as measures of real economic per-
formance of firms. In the BEEPS dataset, firms report the growth in sales and
investment in the last three years before the survey date. The 2008-09 survey col-
lects the data from a period of ease global liquidity 19. My estimation strategy is
based on the following identification assumptions: (1) Low yields in hard curren-
17Larger and older firms are expected to pay a lower interest rate.
18The survey data from BEEPS asks which type of collateral was required: Land or Building,
Equipment, Accounts Receivable, Personal Assets or Other collateral.
19This wave of survey collects 2007 data, when the East Europe is still in the credit boom before
the 2008 crisis
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cies lead to easier financial conditions in emerging markets, so that foreign currency
credit supply increased before the 2008 crisis; (2) Foreign firms or exporting firms
all else equal may have more “access to external finance”; (3) As non-tradable sector
firms have little FX revenues compared to tradable sector firms, FX borrowing in the
non-tradable sector is more likely to cause currency mismatch. The vulnerabilities
from currency mismatch might prevent such firms from additional borrowing that
could translate to a higher growth rate.
Sales and investment data is available in the 2008 survey. The survey reports
the value of sales and investment in 2007, as well as the the values in 2004 for the
same firm. So I can construct data on three-year growth in sales and investment
between 2004-2007 for each firm. I run regressions using cross-sectional data in 2007
while using the change between 2004 and 2007 as the performance measurement. I
estimate the following equation:
∆ln(Salesi,c,j,t) = βFXi,c,j + γXi,c,j + φj,c + εi,c,j (2.3)
where the dependent variable ∆ln(Salesi,c,j,t) = ln(Sales)i,c,j,t−ln(Sales)i,c,j,t−3
refers to the three-year sales growth before the survey date, for firm i, in country c,
in sector j and at time t. 20 The other equation I estimate is:
Investment ratei,c,j = βFXi,c,j + γXi,c,j + φj,c + εi,c,j (2.4)
where the “Investment rate” is calculated as investment divided by the previ-
ous year’s capital stock. In the two equations above, “FX” is a dummy indicating
whether the firm has borrowed in foreign currency in 2004. X is a set of firm-specific
20Since this is cross-sectional data, I dropped the time script t here.
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control variables, including sales in 2004, foreign ownership and age of firms. “For-
eign ownership” can be included as a continuous variable or as a dummy for foreign
ownership (for a threshold of 10% foreign ownership). I also include sector-country
fixed effects in this estimation.
To focus on firms with “currency mismatch”, I estimate equations (2.3) and
(2.4) using the sub-sample of firms in the non-tradable sector (or non-exporters).
Although I do not have data on currency composition of revenue, firms with FX
borrowing in the non-tradable sector (or non-exporters) are more likely to have
revenue in domestic currency and thus have currency mismatch. Here I define a
firm as a “non-exporter” if its export share in sales is less than 10%.
Two major channels of the impact of FX lending are discussed earlier in this
chapter. One is lowering of the user cost of capital (the price of borrowing) and the
other is the easing of liquidity constraints (the amount of borrowing).21 I can test the
relevance of the latter channel via allowing heterogeneous effects of FX borrowing for
various sub-groups of firms, with presumably different levels of liquidity constraints.
Small, domestic and non-trading firms are usually regarded to be more liquidity
constrained. Therefore, to test the importance of the liquidity constraint channel,
I estimate specifications with interaction terms of the indicator variable for FX
borrowing with measures of firm size, foreign ownership or exporting status.
21The failure of UIP results in lower user cost for foreign currency loans.
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FX borrowers perform worse in crisis time?
The recent published 2012-2013 BEEPS survey data allows me to examine the
impact of FX borrowing on firm outcomes in the aftermath of recent financial crisis,
instead of just in tranquil times. Sales growth rates from 2008 to 2011 are available,
which provides the possibility to study FX lending dynamics and vulnerabilities
from currency mismatch. The balance sheet channel affects all firms indebted in
foreign currency. A firm is affected if it had foreign currency loans in 2008, while
the FX borrowing dummy takes value zero for all those who had no FX loans in
2008. Specifically, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression to test whether
FX borrowers have a worse performance in 2011 compared with 200822:
∆ln(Salesi,c,j,t) = β1FXi,c,j × Zi,c,j + β2FXi,c,j + γZi,c,j + φj,c + εi,c,j (2.5)
The left-hand side variable ∆ln(Salesi,c,j,t) is the sales growth of firm i, in country
c, in sector j between 2008 and 2011 (within-firm variation). On the right-hand
side, I interact several firm characteristics Z with the FX borrowing dummy, which
equals one if the firm has a foreign currency loan in 2008. I include country-sector
fixed effects. Firm characteristic vector Z includes firm’s size, foreign ownership and
exporting status.
22Currently, investment data is only available for 2008 survey and not for 2012 survey, so I have
to use sales growth as performance measure.
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2.4.4 Propensity Score Matching
In order to address limitations of the linear regressions (assumption on linear
treatment effect) described in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, I implement a propensity
score matching procedure (PSM) designed to explicitly match firms that are similar
in their likelihood of borrowing in foreign currency. The basic idea is to simulate
a randomized experiment, in which “treated” and “control” firms are paired. Then
I compare the means, across the treated and the control groups, of the outcome
variables of interest.
Specifically, the propensity matching procedure follows three steps. First, I
use a logit model to estimate the probabilities of FX borrowing, i.e. propensity
scores, for the full sample and currency mismatch sample (no FX revenue). The
logit is based on firm characteristics and industry-country fixed effects. Second,
I group observations into intervals with similar propensity scores (propensity score
strata), and test whether the means of each right-hand side variable are equal across
treated and non-treated units within each stratum. Third, I construct the relevant
control group for each treated firm using a proximity measure based on propensity
scores, and compare the mean of the outcome variables of interest. For the proximity
measure, I use the kernel matching estimator proposed by Heckman et al. (1998).
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2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Which Firms Borrow in Foreign Currency?
Following the empirical strategy in Section 2.4.1, Table 2.8 provides estimation
results for Equation (2.1), in which FX loan dummy is regressed on firm and loan
characteristics using a Probit model. Columns (1) to (3) report results for the whole
sample and for sub-sample of small firms and large firms, respectively. Small firms
are defined as firms with less than 100 employees.
Generally speaking, the estimates displayed in Table 2.8 confirm that foreign
currency borrowing is systematically related to indicators of foreign currency rev-
enue. Exporters and foreign firms are more likely to obtain foreign currency loans.
Moreover, I find a significant positive correlation between size (in terms of annual
sales) and the probability of FX borrowing. The age of the firm has no additional
effect once I control for sales. Finally, I find that loans with a longer maturity are
more likely to be in a foreign currency, implying that banks are particularly reluc-
tant to lend long-term in local currency. Only 25% of loans with less than one year
maturity are denominated in foreign currency, while 35% of three-year loans are in
FX. The coefficient on Collateral is only significant for large firms, where loans with
a collateral requirement are more likely to be in local currency.
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Table 2.8: Firm-level determinants of FX borrowing
Dependent variable Prob(loan in foreign currency)
Sample All firms SME Large firms
(1) (2) (3)
Exporter 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.40***
(0.069) (0.081) (0.153)
Foreign firms 0.43*** 0.55*** 0.46***
(0.12) (0.15) (0.22)
ln(sales) 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.131***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.046)
ln(age) -0.01 -0.02 0.01
(0.055) (0.064) (0.135)
Collateral -0.068 -0.001 -0.363*
(0.081) (0.092) (0.205)
Maturity 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 3389 2726 580
Adjusted R-squared 0.294 0.304 0.295
Country-sector fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the firm-level and loan-level determinants of foreign currency borrowing
in a probit model. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is denominated in
foreign currency. Firm-level characteristics include exporter dummy, foreign firm dummy, sales,
firm age. Loan-level characteristics include whether collateral is required and the maturity (in
months). Each regression includes country-sector fixed effect. Robust standard errors in
parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2.5.2 Violation of Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
Can foreign currency borrowing enable firms to borrow at a lower interest rate?
Table 2.9 reports the results of estimating equation (2.2), for the samples of all firms,
small firms and large firms. The estimates suggest that interest rates on foreign
currency loans are between 1.9% to 2.3% lower than the interest rates on domestic
currency loans. This effect is significant at the 1% level in all specifications, and
the difference between foreign and domestic currency interest rates is larger among
small firms compared to large firms. Getting access to foreign currency loans could
help small firms more than large firms in emerging Europe. In addition, larger firms
pay a lower interest rate as expected.
Another important control variable is foreign ownership. In columns (1) to (3),
the “foreign ownership” measure can take any value between 0 and 100 representing
the percentage of capital owned by foreign investors at the survey date. In columns
(4) to (6), “Foreign-owned” is a dummy that takes the value of one if the company
is majority owned (more than 50%) by a foreign investor and zero otherwise. I
find evidence that foreign owned firms on average have a lower interest rate (e.g.
0.94% lower in Column 1 and 0.62% lower in Column 4). However, the effect is not
significant in the sub-sample of small firms. This supports the assumption that the
cost of credit is lower for foreign-owned firms than domestic firms, both for exporters
and non-exporters, after controlling for firm size and age and other collateralization
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requirements.23. Since a high currency depreciation rate would translate to a higher
real interest rate paid by a foreign currency borrower, in the table I have adjusted
the reported interest rate by adding the local currency depreciation rate ε if the
loan is borrowed in foreign currency (in other words, I use r∗ + ε to include the
depreciation risk). I still find that foreign currency borrowing is a cheaper source of
credit, which implies r > r∗ + ε.
2.5.3 The Impact of FX Lending Before the Crisis
Sales growth
First, I investigate whether borrowing in foreign currency contributed to higher
sales growth before the crisis. The results for Equation (2.3) are shown in Table 2.10.
The key variable “FX” is a dummy whether the firm has borrowed in foreign currency
in 2004. Regression results indicate that firms with FX borrowing generally enjoy a
higher sales growth rate. Columns (2) and (3) show the results for the sub-samples
of non-tradable sector firms and non-exporting firms, which are more likely to have
a currency mismatch. Specifically, column (2) uses the sample of firms who report a
larger than 50% revenue share from the non-tradable sector, while firms in column
(3) have export shares less than 10%. The results are relatively robust across the
three columns. On average, firms with foreign currency borrowing have a higher
three-year sales growth rate by 6% to 7%. In addition, the results show younger
23I tried another regression based on the sample of exporters and non-exporters, and get a similar












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: Sales growth and FX borrowing
Dependent variable Sales growth rate in 2004- 2007
Sample All firms Non-tradable sector Non-exporters
(1) (2) (3)
FX 6.74*** 6.82** 6.00**
(2.12) (3.36) (2.42)
Foreign 0.016 0.017 -0.007
(0.037) (0.057) (0.052)
Firm size (log) 0.62 0.45 0.52***
(0.52) (0.73) (0.59)
Firm age (log) -3.86*** -4.81*** -3.65***
(1.13) (2.11) (1.50)
Observations 2793 1404 2016
Adjusted R-squared 0.194 0.217 0.242
Country-sector fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results on the impact of foreign currency borrowing on sales growth
rate before the crisis (2004-2007). Results are reported for the whole sample, and subsamples of
non-tradable sectors, non-exporters, as currency mismatch is more relevant for firms with no
foreign currency revenue. Foreign ownership, firm size and firm age are included as control
variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
firms are associated with a higher growth rate in sales before the financial crisis in
2008.
Investment rate
The results for the investment rate in equation (2.4) are shown in Table 2.11.
The results indicate that firms with FX borrowing in 2004 on average have a higher
investment rate. Access to foreign currency credit could translate to a higher in-
vestment rate in the credit boom period before 2008. Columns (2) and (3) show
the result for the sub-sample of non-tradable sector firms and non-exporting firms,
which are more likely to have a currency mismatch. Specifically, column (2) uses the
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sample of firms who report larger than a 50% for share of revenue from non-tradable
sector, while firms in column (3) have export shares less than 10%.
The result in column (1) shows that on average, the investment rate of firms
that took foreign currency loans to finance their investment was around 7% higher
compared to firms without dollar debt. The coefficient for foreign ownership is not
significant. It implies that the investment rate in foreign-owned firms who hold FX
debt is not significantly different from the rate in domestic firms who hold FX debt.
Once the firm can get access to foreign currency credit, foreign ownership has no
additional effect on firm’s investment.
For non-exporters, FX borrowers have a higher investment rate by 8.1% as
shown in column (3). The coefficients for control variables show that firms with
larger sales in 2004 and younger firms have a higher investment rate before the fi-
nancial crisis in 2008. In addition, there is evidence that more financially constrained
firms (firms that are both small and non-exporters) could benefit more from access
to FX loans. FX borrowers among small and non-exporters have a higher invest-
ment rate by 8.5% as shown in column (4). This suggests that the liquidity easing
channel was at work. This evidence is consistent with the findings in Ranciere et al.
(2010).
2.5.4 Propensity Score Matching Results
To better test the relationship between foreign currency borrowing and terms


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(PSM) as discussed in Section 4 to deal with selection bias. The PSM estimation
is based on propensity scores estimated from a logit regression of FX borrowing on
firm-level characteristics and industry-country fixed effects24.
Table 2.12 presents differences in means between the treated group (with an
FX loan) and the control group (without an FX loan) for interest rate, maturity,
growth in sales, growth in employment, growth in investment. These differences in
means measure the average treatment effect on the treated group. In columns (4)-
(6), I use the subset of small and non-exporter firms to target firms with “currency
mismatch”, since these firms have little foreign currency revenue.
The matching results show that interest rates are 2.5% lower for firms with
FX borrowing. Focusing on the currency mismatch sample (small and non-exporter
firms) leads to a higher difference in interest rates between treated and control firms
(3.1% vs. 2.5%). Borrowing in foreign currency is also associated with 14 months
longer in loan maturity.
2.5.5 Sales Growth in the Aftermath of Crisis
To capture the balance sheet effects caused by currency depreciation during
the crisis, I measure the difference in sales growth from 2008 to 2011 across affected
and unaffected firms, where I measure FX borrowing in 2008. To control for foreign
currency revenue, exporting status and foreign ownership are introduced among the
control variables, and I also include interactions of these controls with FX borrowing
24The control variables in the logit regression include: foreign ownership, exporter dummy, log

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.13: Balance sheet effects: impact of FX loans during crisis
Dependent variable sales growth within the firm
with interaction terms (1) (2) (3)








Observations 3570 3570 3570
Adjusted R-squared 0.070 0.077 0.073
Country-sector fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results on the impact of foreign currency borrowing on sales growth
rate during the crisis time. The dependent variable is the within-firm sales growth rate between
2008 and 2011. FX is a dummy for whether the firm has borrowed in foreign currency. Robust
standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
dummy. The results for Equation (2.5) are presented in Table 2.13. Only the results
for main parameters of interest are reported, and sales, exporter and foreign-owned
variables are also included without interactions.
As shown in Table 2.13, I find there is a negative and significant impact of
foreign currency borrowing on the sales growth rate during the crisis period. This is
consistent with the country-level data, as countries with a higher share of FX debts
before the crisis suffered a deeper recession in the recent financial crisis in 2008-2010.
The coefficients on interaction terms also show that larger, foreign and exporting
firms with FX loans suffered a smaller decline in sales growth than other firms




The productive sector in developing countries needs external finance to fund
investments that contribute to output growth. FX borrowing has become an impor-
tant source of external finance. Before the recent financial crisis, the share of FX
loans exceeded that of domestic currency loans in many eastern Europe countries.
This chapter shows that lower interest rates in foreign currency loans give firms an
incentive to borrow in dollars rather than domestic currency. As a result of the
sizable interest rate differentials, FX borrowing was a rather common phenomenon,
even for small non-exporter firms.
However, the cheaper foreign currency debt comes at the cost of currency
mismatch risk on the borrower’s balance sheet. My results show that these risks
are not significant in the pre-crisis period. I find that firms with currency mismatch
exhibit faster sales and investment growth during this period. In addition, I use
the recent round of survey data to cover the immediate run-up and aftermath of
the recent financial crisis. The recent period is particularly interesting for studying
FX lending dynamics and vulnerabilities from currency mismatch in this region.
Results show that foreign currency credit is associated with a lower sales growth
rate between 2008 and 2011. An interesting avenue for future work is to investigate
whether FX lending is largely supply driven. Is FX lending in Eastern Europe driven
by domestic banks or foreign bank subsidiaries with access to FX funding? Bank
level data are needed to answer these questions from the supply side.
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Chapter 3: Can Monetary Expansion Keep Zombie Firms Alive? Ev-
idence from China (co-authored with Wei Guo and Calvin
Dun Jia)
3.1 Introduction
Following the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, Japan experi-
enced a decade of economic recession. During this period, many Japanese banks con-
tinued to lend to otherwise insolvent firms (“zombie firms”). As China’s growth has
slowed after the global financial crisis, an army of “zombie firms” has also emerged.
The term “zombie firms”, as first mentioned in literature by Kane (1987), refers to
firms that would go bankrupt due to poor earnings and heavy indebtedness but
survive only with external support from governments or the financial sector. The
government wants to keep zombie firms alive because it worries about the rampant
unemployment and loss of tax revenue when these firms are wiped out. The banks
are willing to lend because they do not want to see their earnings fall when forced
to record losses and make provisions for bad debts.1 Both the government and the
banks try to help these firms in the hope that there will be a market rebound soon.
1This is similar to Japan’s zombie lending experience in the 1990s.
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Unfortunately, zombie firms can hold back economic recovery in China. Their
existence is likely to prevent resources from being reallocated to more productive
industries and firms, resulting in an uneven playing field and making stimulus policy
less effective. Although China’s stimulus plan triggered an unprecedented credit flow
to the real economy through the banking system, it could be the case that zombie
firms absorbed more credit flow relative to healthy firms. Senior leaders in China
have pledged to phase out poor-performing zombie enterprises. Closing companies
with overcapacity is a priority of the government’s “supply-side reform” strategy.
But before the implementation of reforms, we should understand what zombie firms
look like in China, who are they, what are the distortionary effects of zombie firms?
Historically, the distortionary effects of zombie firms on healthy firms have been
analyzed mainly in the context of the Japanese economy in the 1990s (Caballero et al.
(2008); Peek and Rosengren (2005); Hoshi (2006)). These studies have focused on
forbearance lending, which helped inefficient firms, as the main reason that zombie
firms were kept alive. Recently zombie firms have been discussed in several studies in
a number of countries, including Korea (Bank of Korea, 2013), the United Kingdom
(Bank of England, 2013), Southern Europe (Acharya et al. (2016)), and OECD
countries (Adalet McGowan et al. (2017)). But there is little systematic research on
the issue of zombie firms in China, despite its importance for policy making.
In this chapter, we use a large representative panel data of Chinese manufac-
turing firms over 1998-2013 to conduct a systematic study of zombie firms in China.
First, we calculate the share of the “zombie firms” in China by applying a modified
framework based on Caballero et al. (2008) as a definition for zombie firms. We
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find that the overall percentage of zombie firms in China reached around 10%-20%
during 2005 to 2013. We also show that the prevalence of and resources sunk in
zombie firms have risen following the stimulus plan after the financial crisis.
Second, after describing the summary statistics, we investigate the effects of
identified monetary shocks on the performance of zombie firms, to see if expansion-
ary monetary shocks help zombie firms to survive and expand. We find that the
monetary stimulus plan after the crisis tend to push banks to distribute bank loans
and capital in favor of zombie firms. The performance of zombie firms (in terms
of employment and output growth, credit access and investment rate) is more re-
sponsive to the policy stimulus relative to non-zombie firms. Third, we study the
crowd-out effects from the existence of zombie firms. Generally, we find that the ex-
istence of zombie firms inhibits the performance of non-zombie firms, consistent with
the Japanese literature. After controlling for cyclical influences at the city-industry
level, within-industry analysis shows that a higher share of industry capital sunk in
zombie firms tends to crowd-out the credit access and investment rate of the typical
non-zombie firm. Assuming a causal relationship, our estimates imply that a 1%
increase in an industry’s zombie share would be associated with a 0.3% decline in
short term borrowing and around a 0.5% decline in the investment rate for a typical
non-zombie firm. Besides limiting the expansion of healthy incumbent non-zombie
firms, market congestion generated by zombie firms can also create barriers to en-
try. Consistent with the findings in a recent OECD report (Adalet McGowan et al.,
2017), our results show that zombie congestion tends to widen the average TFP gap
between zombie and non-zombie firms. This larger TFP gap arises since entrants
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must clear a higher productivity threshold to survive in an environment with more
zombie firms and lower market profitability, as zombie firms congestion may inflate
wages and depress market prices and non-zombie market shares.
The next section describes the firm-level data and provides descriptive evidence
on zombie firms in China. Section 3.3 outlines the empirical specification used to
estimate the responsiveness and survival of zombie firms to stimulus plan, and to
estimate the distortionary effects of zombie firms on non-zombie firms’ performance
and patterns of productivity-enhancing capital reallocation. Section 3.4 discusses the
results. The final section provides concluding remarks and highlights the relevance
of the findings for policy and future research.
3.2 Data and Identification of Zombie Firms
3.2.1 Firm-level Data
Our data for Chinese firms are from China Annual Surveys of Industrial Firms
(CASIF) from 1998 through 2013. These surveys are conducted by the Chinese
government’s National Bureau of Statistics. CASIF is a (truncated) census of all
non-state firms with more than 5 million yuan in revenue (about $600,000) plus all
state-owned firms. The revenue cutoff threshold increases to 10 million yuan (about
$1.2 million) in later years after 2007. The raw data consist of 100,000 - 150,000
firms before 2004 and grow to 200,000 - 300,000 firms in the years after 2004.
93
Firm-level data from 1998-2007 in this database has been widely used in the
literature; see the detailed description in Chapter 1. This chapter is the first research
to use the newly released data covering the later years from 2008 to 2013.
3.2.2 Definition of Zombie Firms
Previous studies proposed different methods for identifying zombie firms, rang-
ing from less restrictive (firms with negative profits) to more restrictive (firms likely
receiving subsidized credit, mainly focusing on listed firms). We follow Caballero
et al. (2008) as a baseline criterion to identify a firm as a zombie if its interest
payments are lower than its hypothetical minimum interest payments without any
concessions. We try to use the same definition as they created for listed firms in
Japan, but it is hard to replicate exactly with the variables available in Chinese
firm-level data, as their definition requires very detailed information on the firm’s
debt distribution, in terms of bank loans and corporate bonds with different matu-
rities. We modify their original definition based on listed firms in Japan to make it
feasible for manufacturing census data in China, which is a much broader sample.
In addition, we refine the definition used in Fukuda and Nakamura (2011).
They propose to additionally consider (1) insolvency and (2)“ever-greening”of loans,
because identifying zombie firms based only on interest payment information is prone
to the following two types of error. First, healthy firms would be wrongly identified
as zombies if the interest rates they pay are below prime lending rates because of
their low credit risk or political favors. Second, zombie firms could be wrongly
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identified as non-zombies if they pay interest at market interest rates as a result of
receiving new loans for the repayment of old loans (“ever-greening”). Here is the
detailed three-step procedure used to identify zombie firms in the firm-level dataset.
Step 1: Estimate the minimum required net interest payment of firm i in year








where SDi,t denotes short-term debt minus accounts payable, taxes payable
and other payable items which approximately measures short-term bank debt, and




t are the average short-term and
long-term prime rate in year t. Interest rates historically are regulated in China.
The People’s Bank of China has set the lower limit of lending rate as 0.9 times the
benchmark rate until 2013, which is the prime rate. The last term, RAdji,t measures
firm’s interest earning from bank deposits. Specifically, RAdji,t is estimated as follows:
RAdji,t = r
D
t (LAi,t−1 − ARi,t−1 − Inventoryi,t−1) (3.2)
where LA, AR, Inventory are, respectively, firm’s liquid assets, accounts re-
ceivable, and inventory, and rD is the one-year bank deposit rate.
Step 2: Comparing the actual net interest payment of the firm, RPayi,t , and
the minimum required net interest payment R∗i,t, and standardizing using loans in
the previous period (Bi,t−1 = SDi,t−1 + LDi,t−1), the interest rate gap is:
Gapi,t = (R
Pay
i,t −R∗i,t)/(SDi,t−1 + LDi,t−1) (3.3)
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Following Caballero et al. (2008), if Gapi,t < 0, firm i has received subsi-
dized borrowing, and we define the zombie indicator to be 1; otherwise the zombie
indicator is 0.
Step 3: Refine the“zombie”definition following Fukuda and Nakamura (2011)
to additionally consider insolvency and “ever-greening” of loans.
 First, we adjust firms’ zombie indicator based on their profitability. If firm
i is classified as a zombie in baseline criterion, but its profit is greater than
the gap between the minimum required net interest payment and actual net
interest payment, i.e. Profiti,t + R
Pay
i,t ≥ R∗i,t, then we reclassify firm i as a
non-zombie firm to correct the Type-1 error (False zombie).
 Second, to control for evergreen loans among non-zombie firms as defined in the
baseline criterion, we provide the following modification. If (1) a firm’s debt
ratio is over 50% (Total Debt/Total Asset > 50%: high-leverage); (2) actual
annual profit is negative, where actual profit means book profit net of fiscal
subsidies and tax rebates; and (3) debt is still increasing (∆Total Debt > 0:
total outstanding debt at the end of year t is higher than the long-term debt at
the end of year t−1), we reclassify this firm as a zombie to correct the Type-2
error (False non-zombie). That is, zombie firms are those that are capable of
obtaining more debt although they are already highly leveraged and have no
potential to repay that debt (negative profit).
 In addition, we also apply the continuity criterion. We impose a three-year
restriction to capture a prolonged liquidity problem, which presumably stems
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from a solvency problem. If firm i is defined to be a zombie for three consec-
utive years, then set zombie dummy to be 1. Otherwise, set it to be 0.
We apply this definition to the Chinese manufacturing census data, and find that
the overall percentage of zombie firms has actually been quite high in recent years.
Figure 3.1 plots the share of zombie firms over 1999 to 2013. Since the variable “ac-
counts payable” is only available for years 2005-2013, we can not adjust for accounts
payable in the calculation of short-term debt before 2005. Therefore zombie firm
shares tend to be overestimated between 1999-2004, as the minimum required net
interest payment is overestimated.
Therefore we focus on the period after 2004. Table 3.1 reports the zombie firm
shares (according to the zombie definition criterion following Fukuda and Nakamura,
2011) in terms of number of firms and weighted by employment, debt and capital
stock during 2005-2013. Although the zombie share declined before the crisis in
2005-2007, it increased from 13% to 19% after the stimulus plan in 2008.
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Table 3.1: Proportion of zombie firms by year
Year Total obs. % Firms % Employment % Debts % Capital
2005 278,490 18.0% 17.4% 22.0% 16.9%
2006 306,117 15.8% 14.9% 17.4% 13.7%
2007 341,516 13.1% 11.3% 13.3% 10.5%
2008 364,086 14.7% 13.1% 16.3% 12.8%
2009 225,666 19.4% 15.2% 15.1% 14.2%
2010 308,876 16.0% 13.2% 15.6% 12.0%
2011 292,975 14.8% 14.7% 15.7% 15.0%
2012 322,241 10.6% 12.6% 18.2% 17.9%
2013 319,839 10.8% 11.5% 15.1% 13.8%
Source: Authors’ estimation. The last four columns report the proportion of zombie firms in
terms of number of firms, employment, total debts and capital (fixed assets) among all the firms
in the data sample.
Figure 3.1: Proportion of zombie firms by year


















Fraction of Chinese Zombie Firms (1999-2013)
Criterion 1 (Profitability) Criterion 2 (Leverage) Criterion 3 (Continuity)
Source: Author’s calculation. Criterion 2 is used as the benchmark zombie firm
definition in this chapter.
We calculate the proportion of zombie firms for every two-digit level industry
and find the proportion of zombie firms has significant industry heterogeneity. Table
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Table 3.2: Industries with high proportion of zombie firms
Industry Code Industry Proportion
28 Manufacture of Chemical fibers 21.0%
14 Manufacture of foods 18.0%
40 Manufacture of Communication Equipment 17.9%
36 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 17.8%
17 Manufacture of Textiles 16.4%
32 Smelting and Processing of Ferrous Metals 16.3%
25 Processing of Petroleum, Coking 16.1%
Source: Authors’ estimation. Industry refers to 2-digit level detail according to NACE Rev.2,
covering manufacturing sector (industry codes 06-42).
3.2 shows that the proportion of zombie firms is higher in heavy chemical industries.
This is consistent with the fact that heavy chemical industries are strongly supported
by governments of various levels, and they are the main borrowers in the financial
markets. Therefore, both governments and banks are unwilling to see the collapse of
these firms. Some labor-intensive industries also have a higher share of zombie firms,
such as the “textile industry” and “manufacture of foods”. Local governments try to
support these firms due to their political responsibility for maintaining employment,
since these firms hire a relatively large share of the local labor force.
3.2.3 Monetary Policy Shock in China
China’s monetary policy is quantity-based, in contrast to the interest rate
based policy in the US. One unique feature of monetary policy in China is their
use of M2 growth as a policy instrument to stabilize macroeconomic fluctuations.2
Furthermore, the Chinese financial system is dominated by commercial banks, and
2In 1999, the People’s Bank of China officially switched monetary policy from controlling bank
credit to controlling M2 growth.
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the M2 growth rate is closely connected to the lending behavior of commercial banks.
A higher M2 growth rate implies banks would lend more and there is a positive credit
supply shock.
Following Chen et al. (2016), we estimated a monetary policy reaction function
with asymmetric responses to output gaps using quarterly data ranging from 1999Q1
to 2016Q4, using the PBOC’s stated main policy instrument, M2 growth. Similar
to Chen et al. (2016), we find that M2 in China increases when GDP growth falls
short the national target set by the central government while it slows down when
the GDP gap is widened. We take the residuals from estimations with Markov
Regime-switching as China’s monetary policy shocks. For robustness, we also esti-
mated a standard Taylor-type M2 growth reaction function to the inflation rate and
the GDP growth rate using GMM. In Figure 3.2, we find the identified monetary
policy shocks are extremely close to each other using either scheme. There was an
expansionary spike of in monetary policy occurring in 2009. In the aftermath of the
unprecedented stimulus in 2009, the central bank pursued contractionary monetary
policy by tightening M2 supply after 2010.
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Figure 3.2: M2 growth shocks in China












Note: Estimations based on quarterly data from 1999Q1 to 2016Q4
3.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.3 presents the mean of key firm characteristics for all zombie firms and
the corresponding statistics for all non-zombie firms included in our sample universe.
To facilitate comparison, we also compute mean differences between these two sub-
samples and report the p-values of t-tests. The table indicates that zombie firms are
(on average) very different from non-zombie firms. Zombie firms on average are less
productive (in terms of labor productivity) and have significantly higher levels of
debt, higher leverage ratios (0.63 vs. 0.51), higher shares of long-term debt among
all debts (10% vs 7%) and lower profitability ratios. In addition, zombie firms are
more capital intensive (higher capital-to-labor ratio), more likely to be state-owned
and older.
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Table 3.3: Sub-sample mean comparison: zombie vs. non-zombie firms
Variables (mean) Non-Zombies Zombies diff p-value
Employment (log) 5.08 4.96 0.11 0.00
Output (log) 10.70 9.97 0.73 0.00
Labor productivity (log) 5.52 4.88 0.64 0.00
Capital/Labor (K/L ratio) 3.63 3.89 -0.26 0.00
Investment rate % 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.00
Short-term debt (log) 9.17 9.60 -0.43 0.00
Long-term debt (log) 2.45 3.42 -0.97 0.00
Long-term debt % 0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.00
Debt/Asset (Leverage) 0.51 0.63 -0.12 0.00
SOE dummy 0.03 0.13 -0.10 0.00
Profit rate % 0.06 -0.96 1.02 0.00
Firm age (years) 15.20 19.72 -4.52 0.00
Sample size 393,635 71,209
Source: Authors’ estimation. Sample covers 2005-2013 when we have accounts payable data
available to adjust short-term debts.
Figure 3.3 compares the distributions of the leverage ratio for zombie and non-
zombie firms in 2005-2013 graphically. The leverage ratio distribution of zombie
firms is largely located to the right of healthy firms, implying a significant difference
between the leverage ratios of zombie firms and healthy firms. We will control for
this leverage ratio difference in the next step of the empirical analysis.
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Note: Leverage ratio is defined as firm-level total debt (the sum of long-term debt and
short term debt) divided by total assets. Zombie dummy is defined in section 2.2.
Source: Author’s calculation based on Chinese Industrial Firm-level Data.
3.3 Empirical Framework
The empirical framework uses panel data constructed from China’s manufac-
turing census across years to explore heterogeneous responses to identified mone-
tary shocks, and the distortionary effects of zombie firms on the performance of
non-zombie firms.
3.3.1 Heterogeneous Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks
It is important to understand which type of firms is more responsive to a given
monetary policy shock. We consider the following specification to check if zombie
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firms disproportionately benefit from expansionary monetary shocks:
Yicst = αi + δcst + βZombiei ×Monetary shockt−1 + γXicst + εicst (3.4)
where Yicst refers to firm-level outcomes for firm i, in city c, in sector s and
in year t. Here we include the growth rate of four variables, employment, output,
short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing and the level of investment rate. Policy
stimulus could increase output and employment, which are the aims of government
stimulus. Therefore, we will test the effect of policy stimulus on firms’ output
and employment growth. Possible misallocation would be reflected in differential
changes in borrowing capacity across firms, so we test the differential impacts of
policy stimulus on growth of short-term and long-term borrowing between zombie
and non-zombie firms. The investment rate (I/K) is defined as changes in fixed
assets plus depreciation divided by lagged fixed assets.
Zombiei is a time-invariant dummy equal to 1 if a firm is classified as a zombie
firm in the first two years. Here I do not use firms’ zombie status at time t since
it is more endogenous to monetary shocks. Monetary shocks are represented by
the M2 growth rate shock identified from the GMM framework described in section
3.2.3. Firm controls Xicst include firm age and firm size. The variables Zombiei and
Monetary shockt−1are dropped in the baseline model, which includes interacted city,
industry and year fixed effects δcst as well as firm fixed effects αi. We focus on the
coefficient of the interaction term β, to examine if zombie firms were favored under
policy stimulus after the financial crisis. Our hypothesis is that zombie firms have
an advantage in competing for new credit supplied by the banking system (China’s
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quantity-based monetary policy works through bank lending). Robust standard
errors are clustered at the city level.
3.3.2 How did Stimulus Affect the Prevalence of Zombies?
In addition to studying how zombie firms respond to policy shocks relative to
non-zombie firms, we also investigate the marginal effect of government stimulus on
the prevalence of zombies in the province (extensive margin). We apply the following
probit model:
Prob(Zombieicst = 1) = βMonetary shockt−1 + γXicst + δcs + εicst (3.5)
where Zombieit is the firm-level zombie dummy index, and monetary shocks
are represented by the M2 growth rate shock. Firm controls Xicst include firm age
and firm size. We control for city-industry fixed effects instead of the city-industry-
year fixed effects as in the previous equation. The coefficient β reflects the impact
of monetary shocks on formation of zombies.
3.3.3 Zombie Congestion and Non-zombie Firm Performance
Previous theoretical models suggest that zombie firms can adversely affect the
performance of non-zombie firms (crowd-out effects) and contribute to low aggregate
productivity growth. There are two key channels: (i) zombie firms crowd-out credit
access and investment by typical non-zombie firms, (ii) zombie firms hinder efficient
resource allocation and productivity growth, either by preventing more productive
firms from expansion, or preventing new and more dynamic firms from replacing
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inefficient incumbents. Here we test this hypothesis in the context of the Chinese
economy. We estimate the following baseline specification following Caballero et al.
(2008) on the panel data of Chinese firms:
Yicst = β1nonZicst + β2nonZicst × Zcst + γXicst + δcst + εicst (3.6)
where Yicst refers to a measure of firm-level outcome for firm i, in city c, in
sector s and at year t. nonZ is a firm-level dummy equal to 1 if a firm is a non-zombie
firm, while Z is the share of capital sunk in zombie firms for each city and industry.
Firm controls Xicst include firm age and firm size. Equation (3.6) also includes city-
industry-year fixed effects δcst to control for unobserved time-varying city-industry
specific macroeconomic or regional cyclical influences. These city-industry specific
cyclical influences, including the overall business environment of operating in an
industry in a given city for that year, could simultaneously raise the prevalence of
zombie firms and adversely affect firm performance. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the city level. We focus on the interaction term of the non-zombie
dummy and the city-industry level zombie shares. β2 will be negative for borrowing
and investment rate regressions if zombie congestion reduces the ability or incentives
for non-zombie firms to gain access to bank financing and increase investment.
3.3.4 Zombie Congestion and Capital Reallocation
In the previous specification, we test the effect of zombies on the performance
of an average non-zombie firm. Here we move one step further to see if firm pro-
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ductivity heterogeneity plays a role in the distortionary effect of zombies, following
the specification in Adalet McGowan et al. (2017). We test if zombie congestion
disproportionately reduces the ability of more productive firms to attract capital
and expand. If this is the case, then the actual distortionary effects may be larger
than those captured in the “average effect”. Specifically, we consider the following
panel regression on the sub-sample of non-zombie firms:
∆Capitalicst = β1TFPicst−1 + β2TFPicst−1 × Zcst + γXicst + δcst + εicst (3.7)
where ∆Capitalicst refers to the growth rate of the real capital stock for firm i,
in city c, in sector s and at year t. TFP is the level of total factor productivity (TFP)
measured following the method in Wooldridge (2009).3 As in the previous equation,
Z is the share of capital sunk in zombie firms and firm controls Xicst include firm
age and firm size. The equation predicts that β1 will be positive since firms with
higher TFP should attract more resources and grow faster, while β2 will be negative
if the presence of zombie firms distorts the efficiency of capital reallocation. Capital
growth rates in more productive firms are more sensitive to zombie congestion.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Heterogeneous Effects of Monetary Stimulus
Table 3.4 presents the baseline estimates of equation (3.4), which analyzes
the relative responsiveness to monetary policy shocks of zombie firms. We find
3Firm-level prices cannot be observed, so firm-level differences in (revenue-based) TFP may
also reflect differences in market power. Results are also robust if we use the OLS Solow residual
to measure TFP.
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that zombie firms are more responsive to monetary shocks and they indeed have an
advantage in competing for new credit and investment. Columns (1) and (2) show
that a positive monetary shock narrowed the gap between zombie firms and non-
zombie firms. Columns (3) and (4) show that under policy driven credit expansion,
new credit was allocated disproportionately more towards zombie firms, both in
short-term and in long-term borrowing. Following a positive M2 growth rate shock,
zombie firms also have a relatively higher investment rate as shown in Column (5).
Moving relatively more credit resources to zombie firms could be one unintended
consequence of loose monetary policy.
In Table 3.4, we include both leverage and interaction of leverage and monetary
shock in the same regression, to allow firms with different leverage ratios have dif-
ferential responses to monetary shocks. As a robustness check, we divide the sample
into high-leverage and low leverage sub-samples based on the firm-level leverage ra-
tio, and divide the sample into state-owned and non-state-owned sub-samples based
on firm’s ownership. After we control for the leverage ratio and ownership, we still
find that zombie firms were favored in borrowing and growth under policy stimulus
after the financial crisis.
3.4.2 The Impact of Monetary Stimulus on Formation of Zombie Firms
Since we find that monetary stimulus helped improve the performance of zom-
bie firms relatively more than that of non-zombies, we expect that on the one hand,
there could be more zombie firms created by loose monetary policy. On the other
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Table 3.4: Zombie firms under monetary policy stimulus
”∆”: growth rate ∆Emp. ∆Output ∆ST Debt ∆LT Debt It/Kt−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Zombiei ×Monetary shockt−1 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.011* 0.066*** 0.238***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.026)
Leverageit ×Monetary shockt−1 0.005*** 0.010*** -0.182*** -0.094*** 0.082*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.054) (0.027) (0.044)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm age, size and leverage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
S.E. Clustered by city city city city city
Observations 652,793 652,793 652,793 652,793 505,806
R-squared 0.324 0.333 0.250 0.181 0.387
Note: Zombie is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm is classified as a zombie firm in the first two years
in the sample. Monetary shocks are represented by the M2 growth rate shock identified from the
GMM framework described in section 2.3. ST debt and LT debt refer to the short-term and
long-term debt on the firm’s balance sheet. I/K refers to the investment rate, defined as changes
in fixed assets plus depreciation divided by lagged fixed assets. Dependent variables are growth
rates of employment, output, short-term debt and long-term debt in Columns (1)-(4). The
outcome variable is the level of investment rate in Column (5). Clustered standard errors (at city
level) are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01).
Source: NBS Manufacturing Census Data.
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hand, some zombie firms may switch into being non-zombies with the help of loose
monetary policy. Table 3.5 suggests that current monetary stimulus is correlated
with a higher share of zombie firms, while monetary stimulus in the previous period
is correlated with a lower share of zombies. However, the effects are quite small.
Most of the firm-level control variables also have the expected signs. State-
owned firms are more likely than private firms to become zombies, where the mag-
nitude of the coefficient is larger than that of other control variables. The state
sector receives better credit support. In addition, firms that are older, have a higher
leverage ratio and are more capital intensive have a higher probability of obtaining
zombie lending.
3.4.3 Zombie Congestion, Non-zombie Firm Performance and Capital Realloca-
tion
Table 3.6 presents the baseline estimates of equation (3.6), which analyzes
the distortionary effects of zombie congestion in terms of non-zombie firm’s short-
term debt and long-term debt growth, investment rate and level of total factor
productivity (TFP).4 Zombie shares are measured as the share of capital sunk in
zombie firms at the city-industry level.5 The interaction terms in Column (1) and
(3) show that across cities, an increase in the zombie share at the industry level is
associated with lower short-term borrowing (a proxy for bank loans) and a lower
4This is similar to empirical results of Table 1 in Adalet McGowan et al. (2017) for zombie firm
study in OECD countries.
5Zombie shares defined by employment share provide similar results.
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Table 3.5: Probit model: Determinants of zombies
Zombie dummy Zombie dummy
(1) Lagged M2 shock (2) Current M2 shock
M2growth shock -0.008*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002)
Firm size 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Firm age 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.002) (0.003)
SOE dummy 0.201*** 0.204***
(0.011) (0.011)
Leverage ratio 0.045*** 0.043***
(0.007) (0.006)
Capital intensity 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002)
City-industry FE Yes Yes
S.E. Clustered by city city
Observations 446,589 446,589
Adj. R-squared 0.094 0.095
Note: Each column reports the marginal effect coefficients estimates for a probit model of
determinants of zombie firms. City-industry fixed effects are included. Firm size is measured by
the log of total assets in the last period. Leverage ratio is defined as total debt divided by total
assets. Capital intensity is measured by the log of capital to labor ratio at the firm level.
Clustered standard errors (at city level) are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *
(p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). Source: NBS Manufacturing Census Data.
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investment rate for the average non-zombie firm. A 1% increase in industry zombie
share would be associated with a 0.29% decline in short term borrowing and around
a 0.53% decline in the investment rate for a typical non-zombie firm. The effects on
long-term borrowing are not significant.
The results suggest two issues. First, the prevalence of persistently weak zom-
bie firms that do not exit the market could distort credit allocation by reducing bank
credit to non-zombie firms, and the existence of zombie firms could hinder potential
investment of healthy firms. Second, zombie congestion may reduce potential out-
put growth by distorting productivity-enhancing reallocation, an issue mentioned
by Adalet McGowan et al. (2017) in Section 5.2 for their study in OECD countries.
Column (4) shows that the TFP gap between zombie firms and non-zombie
firms rises as the share of industry capital sunk in zombie firms rises, in line with
the predictions of the model in Caballero et al. (2008). What is the possible expla-
nation behind the widening TFP gap between zombie firms and non-zombie firms?
First, distortions created by the presence of zombie firms depress productivity by
preserving less productive zombie firms at the expense of more productive potential
entrants. Second, since zombie firms create “congestion” and barriers to entry, the
potential marginal entrants must clear a higher productivity threshold for entry to
compensate for lower profitability caused by congestion.
Table 3.7 shows the results for equation (3.7), which estimates the sensitivity of
the growth rate of firm’s real capital stock and investment rate with respect to lagged
firm TFP. The investment rate is similar to the capital growth rate, except that it
includes maintenance investment to offset depreciation. We use the capital sunk in
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Table 3.6: Zombie firms and non-zombie firm performance
Outcomes ∆ST Debt ∆LT Debt It/Kt−1 TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nonzombie dummyit 0.291*** 0.247*** 0.479*** 0.631***
(0.038) (0.034) (0.048) (0.038)
Nonzombie dummyit× -0.292** 0.086 -0.528*** 1.060***
Industry zombie sharescst (0.120) (0.178) (0.204) (0.266)
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm age and size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
S.E. Clustered by city city city city
Observations 426,448 426,448 317,734 458,599
Adj. R-squared 0.034 0.011 0.211 0.259
Note: Zombie shares refer to the share of industry capital sunk in zombie firms for each city and
industry. ST debt and LT debt refer to the short-term and long-term debt (log-level) on the firm’s
balance sheet. I/K refers to the investment ratio. TFP is the level of total factor productivity
measured following Wooldridge (2009). Firm size measured by lagged total assets and firm age
are controlled. Clustered standard errors (at city level) are reported in parentheses. Significance
levels: * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). Source: NBS Manufacturing Census Data.
zombie firms to measure the zombie share. Results show that firms with higher TFP
are able to attract more capital, which implies that capital reallocation is on average
productivity-enhancing. However, the negative coefficient of the interaction term of
lagged TFP and the industry zombie share suggests that a higher zombie share at
the industry level is associated with less productivity-enhancing capital reallocation
within industries. To sum up, zombie firms constrain the real capital growth of more
productive firms, which reduces aggregate TFP via lower allocative efficiency.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we apply the framework from seminal studies of zombie firms
in Japan to a broader panel data sample from the China Manufacturing Census
between 1998 and 2013. We show that the number and the magnitude of undesirable
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Table 3.7: Zombie firms and capital reallocation
Outcomes real capital growth investment rate




Industry zombie sharescst (0.007) (0.038)
City-industry-year FE Yes Yes
Firm age and size controls Yes Yes
S.E. Clustered by city city
Observations 2,089,000 1,386,945
Adj. R-squared 0.284 0.205
Note: Zombie shares refer to the share of industry capital sunk in zombie firms for each city and
industry. I/K refers to the investment ratio. TFP is the level of total factor productivity
measured following Wooldridge (2009). Firm size measured by lagged total assets and firm age
are controlled. Clustered standard errors (at city level) are reported in parentheses. Significance
levels: * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). Source: NBS Manufacturing Census Data.
zombie firms increased sharply after China implemented an enormous monetary
expansion right after the 2008 financial crisis. We find that these zombie firms are
heavily indebted and are kept alive through continuous and distorted monetary and
fiscal supports.
Next, we look at the differential responses of zombie firms and non-zombie
firms to identified monetary shocks in China, in order to study how zombie firms al-
ter the effectiveness of China’s monetary policy and how monetary shocks affect the
growth and survival of zombie firms. Our empirical evidence suggests that zombie
firms disproportionately benefit from expansionary monetary shocks and accom-
modate most of the intended effects of monetary easing. This implies a trade-off
between misallocation and stimulating economic policies. In addition, the prevalence
of zombie firms can also crowd-out performance of non-zombie firms and exacerbate
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resource misallocation even if there is no expansionary monetary shock. We show
that a higher share of industry capital sunk in zombie firms is associated with lower
credit access and investment rate for non-zombie firms, a larger TFP gap between
zombie and non-zombie firms and less productivity-enhancing capital reallocation,
measured as a decline in the ability of more productive firms to attract capital.
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Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data cleaning and summary statistics
Cleaning of basic reporting mistakes
Although the Chinese firm-level data has an original sample of more than
2,000,000 observations and contains rich information, a few variables in the dataset
are noisy and could be misreported by some firms. I clean the sample for mismea-
surement by using the following criteria. First, the key financial variables (such as
total assets, net value of fixed assets, sales, gross value of industrial output) can-
not be missing; otherwise those observations are dropped. Second, the number of
employees hired for a firm must not be fewer than 8 people.1
In addition, following Cai and Liu (2009) and guided by General Accepted
Accounting Principles, I delete observations if any of the following rules are violated:
(a) the total assets must be higher than the current assets, (b) the total assets must
be larger than the total fixed assets, (c) the total assets must be larger than the
net value of the fixed assets, (d) the accumulated depreciation of fixed assets must
1Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest including all Chilean plants with at least ten workers.
Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) suggest dropping firms with fewer than eight employees
as such firms “register as self-employed individuals and operate under a different legal system”. I
follow the latter criterion that the number of employees must be larger than or equal to 8.
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be larger than the current period depreciation, (e) a firm’s identification number
cannot be missing and must be unique, (f) a firm’s sales must be no lower than
RMB 1 million, (g) a firm’s interest payment must be non-negative, and (h) paid-in
capital cannot be negative or zero.
Further quality checks for manufacturing firms
Here I follow the online appendix in Gopinath, Kalemli-Ozcan, Karabarbounis
and Villegas-Sanchez (2015) to examine the quality of variables for firms in China’s
manufacturing sector.
Net worth: I construct net worth as the difference between total assets and
total liabilities. This variable should be equal to the shareholder’s equity by ac-
counting identity. I drop observations that violate this identity. This step drops 541
observations in my sample.
Capital stock: Capital stock is measured as the sum of tangible fixed assets
and intangible fixed assets. Then I drop observations with missing or zero values
for tangible fixed assets. This step drops 8,856 observations in my sample.
Capital-Labor ratio: I examine the quality of the capital to wage bill ratio
variable. I drop observations with ratios higher than the 99.9 or lower than the 0.1
percentile. This step reduces the observations in my sample by 4,222.
Wage bill: I drop firm-year observations with missing, zero or negative values
for the labor wage bill. This step reduces the observations in my sample by 9,508.
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Value added: I construct value added as the difference between operating
revenue and materials input, then I drop the negative values, which corresponds to
175,648 observations.
Winsorization
I winsorize the following variables at the 1 and the 99 percentile: value added,
fixed assets, wage bill, operating revenue, materials, capital, total assets, total lia-
bilities and shareholder’s equity, to make the results less sensitive to outliers. I also
winsorize at the 1 and the 99 percentile of my estimated firm productivity variables.
Summary statistics
Table A.1 presents summary statistics for the dataset after data cleaning in
above steps. All entries in the table are in millions of RMB, except for employment.
Value added, wage bill, total assets and liabilities are deflated with gross output price
indices at the four digits industry level with a base year of 1998. The capital stock
is deflated with the economy-wide price of investment goods. Statistics for both the
whole country and the “opened cities” (defined as cities where foreign banks were
allowed before the end of 2006) are provided. On average, these “opened cities” have
a higher level of value added, wage bill and total assets, but not necessarily higher
level of capital stock at firm level.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics of selected variables
Sample Statistic Mean Std. Dev.
All the cities Value added 12.59 29.73
Employment 280.71 1264.51
Wage Bill 2.96 6.07
Capital Stock 32.70 353.40
Total Assets 52.84 138.11
Total Liabilities 31.06 83.09
“Opened cities” Value added 13.38 31.92
Employment 259.26 850.30
Wage Bill 3.54 6.84
Capital Stock 31.63 34.80
Total Assets 59.40 148.40
Total Liabilities 33.70 87.53
Production function estimates
I estimate the value added production function separately for each two-digit
industry j, to allow the elasticities of value added with respect to inputs to vary at
the two-digit industry level:
log(V Ait) = dt(j) + βl(j)log(wlit) + βk(j)log(kit) + log(TFPit) + εit
where dt(j) is a time fixed effect for each year, V Ait denotes real value added
(nominal value added divided by the 4-digit output price deflator), wlit denotes the
real labor wage bill, and kit denotes real value of fixed assets. In the above equation,
βl(j) and βk(j) denotes the elasticity of value added with respect to labor and
capital. These elasticities vary at 39 industries defined by their two-digit industry
classification. To calculate firm-level productivity, I will choose the methodology
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developed in Wooldridge (2009), which is extension of the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) procedures (WLP method). Given estimated elasticities β̂l(j) and β̂k(j),
firm (log) productivity is calculated as log(TFPit) = log(V Ait) − β̂l(j)log(wlit) −
β̂k(j)log(kit).
In Table A.2, I compare parameters estimated from three approaches: OLS,
LP and Wooldridge-LP methods. I implement LP estimator using“levpet”command
in Stata, and I follow the approach in online appendix of Petrin et al. (2011) for
Wooldridge-LP estimation.
For labor elasticities, the OLS estimates exceed the other two estimates, con-
firming the theoretical OLS bias resulting from the correlation between unobservable
productivity shocks and input levels. In addition, I find the LP estimates are sig-
nificantly lower than the Wooldridge-LP estimates.
Table A.2: Production function estimation
Industry 1. Food 2. Chemical 3. Machinery All industry
Method Obs. 106,330 131,754 134,020 1,931,275
Labor β̂l 0.573 0.520 0.561 0.551
OLS Capital β̂k 0.181 0.233 0.211 0.230
β̂l + β̂k 0.754 0.753 0.772 0.781
Labor β̂l 0.135 0.193 0.204 0.235
LP Capital β̂k 0.192 0.184 0.154 0.165
β̂l + β̂k 0.326 0.377 0.358 0.400
Labor β̂l 0.536 0.475 0.539 0.574
WLP Capital β̂k 0.254 0.279 0.247 0.262
β̂l + β̂k 0.790 0.754 0.786 0.836
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Table A.3 presents summary statistics for the two elasticities and the sum esti-
mated with Wooldridge-LP method. These estimated coefficients look reasonable as
the sum of elasticities is around 0.80, and this is close to previous literature. Figure
A.1 reports the distribution of estimated TFPs for state-owned firms, domestic pri-
vate firms and foreign firms. Domestic private firms are generally more productive
compared with state-owned firms.
Table A.3: Summary statistics of production function estimation
WLP method
Coefficient β̂l + β̂k Labor β̂l Capital β̂k
Mean 0.836 0.574 0.262
Median 0.839 0.581 0.254
Max 1.015 0.811 0.514
Min 0.609 0.289 0.142
Std. Dev. 0.099 0.130 0.071
Figure A.1: Estimated firm-level TFP
Source: Author’s calculation based on Wooldridge-LP methods.
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A.2 Size distributions
Size distribution in the firm-level dataset
Table A.4 shows the distribution of size class in China’s manufacturing firm-
level dataset. 88% of the sample are small/medium firms (<1000 employees), which
accounts for 56% of employment share. Large firms (1000+ employees) account for
the remaining 44% of employment in manufacturing sector.
Table A.4: Share of manufacturing firms by size class
size class by employees
(1) Num. of firms 1-49 50-249 250-999 1000+ Total firms
1998 20.1% 48.7% 24.7% 6.5% 152,198
2001 19.4% 53.2% 22.3% 5.1% 166,807
2004 24.7% 54.0% 17.0% 4.3% 277,449
2007 25.0% 55.4% 16.3% 3.2% 335,813
1998-2007 20.5% 50.0% 18.0% 11.5% 2,177,749
(2) Employment share 1-49 50-249 250-999 1000+
1998 1.5% 16.3% 31.4% 50.9%
2001 1.8% 20.2% 32.1% 45.9%
2004 3.1% 26.0% 31.9% 39.0%
2007 3.3% 26.8% 30.9% 39.0%
1998-2007 2.4% 22.3% 31.6% 43.7%
Comparison: 10 East European countries, 1996-2005
Employment share 1-49 50-249 250+
Amadeus 10.7% 29.4% 60.0%
Eurostat 25.2% 31.2% 43.6%
Notes: For employment distribution across firm size in Amadeus, see Larrain and Stumpner
(2015)
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Firm size and firm-level labor productivity
Here I provide descriptive evidence at the firm level to show the correlation of
firm size and productivity. I find that small firms tend to be more productive than
large firms. Specifically, I run the following regression2:
log(V Ai,j,c/Ni,j,c) = β1Sizei + β2log(Age)i + β3Foreigni + β4Exporteri + ϕj + δc + εi,j,c
where V Ai,j,c/Ni,j,c is value added divided by employees of firm i in industry
j and province (or city) c; Size indicates either whether the plant is small, medium
or large or the log number of employees; and log(Agei) is the log of the number
of years during which the firm i has been operating; and Foreign and Exporter
are indicators for foreign-owned firms and exporters. I also include industry and
province (city) dummies.
Table A.5 shows the results under various specifications. All columns rep-
resent results where the log value added per employee is the dependent variable
and standard errors are clustered at the province level. In columns (1) and (2) the
definition of size is discrete, I include dummies for medium and large firms, and
omitted “small” status is the benchmark. The coefficients associated with size are
negative and significant in all columns. Small firms are associated with higher lev-
els of productivity. I also find that, everything else equal, foreign firms tend to be
more productive but exporters are not necessarily more productive, and are even
less productive than non-exporters in 2007 in one specification.
2As in equation (1) in Garcia-Santana and Ramos (2012)
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Table A.5: Correlation between firm size and productivity
Dependent variable labor productivity: log(V A/N)
Sample year 2007 1998-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medium size -0.725*** -0.723*** -0.870***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.047)




Foreign-owned 0.157*** 0.186*** 0.205***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Exporter -0.079** -0.018 0.001
(0.052) (0.040) (0.028)
Log Age -0.008 0.020 -0.348***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.029)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 325,130 325,130 325,130 1,284,361
R-square 0.156 0.159 0.165 0.178
Notes: Table A.5 shows firm-level regressions of log Productivity against Size of the firm.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the province level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A.3 Foreign bank’s distributions of loans to different types of firms
The following table provides insights of foreign bank loan portfolios by reveal-
ing the percentage of loans to Chinese-based corporations, global corporations, home
country corporations, Chinese banks and foreign banks. The numbers are based on
responses in 2007 from 36 foreign banks in China, including 13 Asian banks, 17
European banks and 6 North American banks. Among the 36 banks that provided
data, 29 banks had loans to Chinese corporations, 27 to global corporations and
home country corporations, 29 to Chinese banks and 11 to other foreign banks.
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Eight banks (Asian and European) had more than 50% of their portfolios allocated
to global corporations. Table A.6 reports the average loan portfolio distribution
among banks from Asia, Europe and North America.
The members of the foreign bank group by region are as follows.
(1) Asian banks: ANZ Banking Group, Business Development Bank, Dah Sing
Banking Corporation, DBS, First Sino Bank, Hang Seng Bank, Industrial Bank of
Korea, Korea Exchange Bank, Maybank, Mizuho Corporate Bank, OCBC, Shinhan
Bank, The Bank of East Asia, Wing Lung Bank;
(2) European banks: ABN AMRO, BNP Paribas S.A., Calyon, Deutsche Bank,
Dresdner Bank, Fortis Bank, HSBC, ING Bank, KBC Bank, Natexis Banque Popu-
laires, Norddeutsche Landesbank, Rabobank, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG,
Royal Bank of Scotland, Sanpaolo Imi Bank, Société Générale, Standard Chartered
Bank, UBS;
(3) North American banks: Bank of America, Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova












































































































































































































































































































































































A.4 Foreign investments in domestic banks: IV regression
Foreign banking investments after deregulation
There are two major modes through which foreign banks can enter the Chinese
banking market once a city is open for foreign investors. First, foreign investors can
set up branches, Chinese-foreign joint venture banks or wholly foreign-funded banks.
These are defined as foreign banks and provide loans to the Chinese market directly.
Alternatively, foreign investors can purchase equity in an existing Chinese bank and
become one of their foreign strategic investors (FSI). The bank is a Chinese bank
with minority foreign ownership. In this way, foreign bank entry can have impact
on Chinese banks and firms indirectly.
I collect information about strategic investments in Chinese banks, including
the names of the Chinese bank and the foreign bank, deal size, year, month, and
investment share (% of Chinese bank).3 Table A.7 and Table A.8 list all the transac-
tions between 2001-2007. The table suggests that after restrictions on foreign bank
entry were relaxed, foreign banks began to gradually invest in Chinese domestic
banks. Here I focus on the investment in city banks as shown in Table A.7, since
these city banks are restricted to lend locally in given cities and therefore there are
no spillover effects.
3The maximum total shares held by foreign investors in one Chinese bank are 20% for a single









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.9 reports the impact of city-level foreign investment in domestic bank-
ing on firm performance, using OLS and instrumental variable (IV) regressions. The
instrument (IV) for foreign banking investment log(FSI) is the city-level foreign
bank deregulation indicator FBank, which is determined by the central govern-
ment. On average, I do not find foreign investment in domestic banking lead a
higher sales or investment level of domestic firms.
Table A.9: The average impact of foreign banking investment (FSI)
Dependent variable log(sales) log(investment)
OLS IV OLS IV
log(FSI) 0.012** 0.014 0.002 0.021
(0.005) (0.015) (0.012) (0.025)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 348,805 348,805 276,314 276,314
Adjusted R-squared 0.842 0.882 0.540 0.663
Notes: Coefficients from regressions of firm outcomes on city-level foreign strategic investment
(FSI) in domestic banks using OLS and IV. The city-level foreign bank deregulation dummy is
used as IV for city-level foreign strategic investment (FSI) in domestic banks. Standard errors,
clustered at the city level, are reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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